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I. INTRODUCTION 
For thirty-five years, the civil rights community has paid scant at­
tention to administrative law principles. Those interested in advancing 
on-the-job equality for this country's working men and women (or in 
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia. - Ed. I thank Bob Brussack, 
Anne Dupre, and Dan White for their comments on this piece. I also thank my research as­
sistant, Melissa Malcom, for her work. 
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preserving employer autonomy vis-a-vis federal encroachment) have 
all but ignored what many consider the arcane technicalities of ad­
ministrative law. 
This state of affairs is strange when one considers that administra­
tion and enforcement of each of our major federal laws outlawing em­
ployment discrimination have been confided to an administrative 
agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").1 
The EEOC, however, has historically been given short shrift by liti­
gants and by the judiciary.2 It is the courts, not the agency, that have 
given meaning to our nation's employment discrimination statutes.3 
This is an unfortunate result for those who believe that political 
accountability and agency expertise matter in determining the mean­
ing of indeterminate statutes. And it is a result at odds with develop­
ments in administrative law that, at least since 1984, have ostensibly 
required courts to pay close attention to the views of agencies charged 
with the administration of statutory regimes.4 
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §§ 7, 9, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 628 (1994); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 705-707, 709-711, 713, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -6, 2000e-8 to -10, 
2000e-12 (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 106-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116-17 
(1994). 
2. See Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination 
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. 
REV. 51, 56 (1995) (noting sources describing the EEOC as "toothless" and a "poor, enfee­
bled thing" as compared to other administrative agencies). For an extended discussion of the 
EEOC's creation and enforcement powers, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ERA 129-59 (1990). 
3. The Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals on the deference the EEOC is due 
under Title VII. Compare EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), with EEOC 
v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988). Until recently, the question of judicial 
deference to the EEOC's interpretations of the statutes it administers arose only infre­
quently in the lower courts. See Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 427 (4th 
Cir. 1999); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 
U.S. 1228 (1994); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192-94 (5th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of 
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992); Colgan v. 
Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1421 n.11 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 
(1991); Philbin v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323-25 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D. Va. 1993), reversed on other 
grounds, 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995). For discussions of the level of deference extended to 
EEOC under Title VII, see White, supra note 2; John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of 
Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 213 (1987); 
Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights 
Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 
(1999). 
4. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), estab­
lished the following two-step approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of stat­
utes: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
Court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is 
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But in 1999, the question of deference to the EEOC grabbed the 
spotlight. It surfaced in a case5 that arose under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), a relatively new, and sweeping, 
anti-discrimination law that prohibits workplace discrimination against 
qualified individuals with a disability.6 A difficult substantive question 
was presented: Is the determination of whether one has a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA to be made with or without regard to 
mitigating measures?7 Instinctively, either a "yes" or a "no" answer 
seems problematic. On the one hand, defining disability without re­
gard to the corrective effects of medication or other devices, such as 
eyeglasses or hearing aids, could so enlarge the class of legally pro­
tected people as to trivialize the very real concerns that prompted the 
enactment of the ADA. On the other hand, if a corrected impairment 
is not considered disabling, the statute is likely to exclude a large 
number of people whose exclusion seems perverse. For example, an 
epileptic or diabetic whose condition is controlled through medication, 
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43. 
The Chevron decision, touted as one that "promises to be a pillar in administrative law 
for many years to come," Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 ,  2075 (1990), was important for its willingness to find implied delega­
tions of interpretive authority. Id. at 2074-75. The Court premised this deferential review 
standard on the greater political accountability of administrative agencies. 467 U.S. at 865. 
When policy choices are to be made, the Chevron Court determined that Congress would 
prefer those choices to be made by politically accountable agencies, rather than by politically 
unaccountable courts. See id. 
But despite its rhetoric, there has been some question from the outset about the Court's 
commitment to Chevron. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 
101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: 
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
749 (1995). 
Academic writing praising and criticizing Chevron is legion. Prominent examples, in ad­
dition to the sources cited above, include Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Douglas W. 
Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doc­
trine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 269 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: 
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 
(1988); The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 
YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986); Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinter­
pretation of Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986 (1987). 
5. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Two companion cases, Murphy 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 527 U.S. 516 (1999) and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 
535 (1999), presented the same issue to the Court. Because the Court chose Sutton as its ve­
hicle for exploring the issue, this Article focuses on the Sutton case. 
6. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
7. In Sutton, twin sisters suffered from myopia that was fully correctable when they wore 
their glasses. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. In Murphy, Vaughn Murphy's high blood pressure was 
stabilized with medication. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519. Mr. Kirkingburg's body had self­
corrected, to a degree, the effects of his monocular vision. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-66. 
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or perhaps an amputee whose prosthetic limb enables her to walk or 
even run, may not be substantially limited in performing major life ac­
tivities because of the mitigating effects of the medication or prosthe­
sis. If the impairment is then not considered disabling, an employer 
would be free to fire or not to hire the individual because she was an 
epileptic, a diabetic, or an amputee. Whatever else Congress had in 
mind when it passed the ADA, protecting individuals from such status 
discrimination would seem to have been firmly within the scope of the 
statute's prohibitions.8 
The ADA is a broadly worded statute,9 and Congress recognized 
that its implementation would require administrative agencies to flesh 
out its terms. Consequently, Congress granted the EEOC substantive 
rulemaking authority to promulgate regulations for carrying out the 
ADA's employment provisions,10 an authority that Congress had 
withheld from the agency under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.11 The EEOC complied with Congress's directions to have its 
ADA regulations in place one year before the statute took effect.12 
The EEOC's regulations included an Interpretive Guidance that spe­
cifically addressed the issue of mitigating measures.13 The EEOC took 
the position that whether one has a disability should be assessed with­
out regard to mitigating measures.14 
A number of lower courts subsequently confronted this question, 
with some accepting the agency's position and others rejecting it.15 The 
8. Sees. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. REP. N0. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990). 
9. See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employ­
ers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 229, 239-41 (1990) (noting statute's 
many ambiguities); Stephen F. Befort and Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: 
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimina­
tion Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 71 (1999) (same). 
10. 42 u.s.c. § 12116. 
11. Congress did not confer substantive rulemaking authority on the agency under Title 
VII; the EEOC possesses only procedural rulemaking authority under that statute. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-12 (1994). Whether a delegation of substantive rulemaking authority is a necessary 
predicate for a finding of an implied delegation of interpretive authority is an open question. 
See infra notes 75-81 for discussion of this point. 
12. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999). 
13. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999). The Interpretive Guidance was subject to 
the same notice and comment rulemaking procedure as the regulations themselves. 
14. "The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as 
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id. 
15. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), va­
cated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999) (mitigating measures generally need not be taken into account); 
Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (1 0th Cir. 1997), aff d, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (mitigating measures to 
be taken into account); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (assess impairment in unmitigated state); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 
(6th Cir. 1997) (take mitigating measures into account in some cases); Doane v. City of 
Omaha, 1 15 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048 (1998) (assess impairment in 
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question of deference to the EEOC's views became a focal point of 
discussion among the circuit courts.16 The central issue was how the 
Chevron doctrine should apply to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance 
on mitigating measures. 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. ,11 the Supreme Court held that agency interpretations of silent or 
ambiguous statutes are binding on courts if the interpretations are rea­
sonable and if Congress has delegated interpretive power to the 
agency.18 Under Chevron, a reviewing court will first ask whether the 
statute itself answers the interpretive question being asked. If it does, 
then no deference to the agency is due, as Congress has made the pol­
icy choice itself and incorporated the chosen policy in the statute.19 If 
the court determines that the statute does not address the issue, how­
ever, and if Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the 
agency, the court, under Chevron, will defer to the agency's reading of 
the statute so long as that reading is a reasonable one, even if it is not 
the reading the court itself would have chosen.20 
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has chosen to resolve interpretive 
questions at Step One of the Chevron analysis. It frequently has done 
so by using a textualist approach to statutory interpretation that finds 
in the statute itself an answer to the interpretive question posed.21 
unmitigated state); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). 
For an overview of these cases, see Isaac S. Greaney, Note, The Practical Impossibility of 
Considering the Effect of Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267 (1999). 
16. Even courts that agreed with the agency's position disagreed on the amount of def­
erence that was due the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance. Compare Harris, 102 F.3d at 521 
(applying Chevron deference), with Washington, 152 F.3d at 469-70 (refusing to give Chev­
ron deference to Interpretive Guidance). See Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Interpretation and Deference in the Judicial Proc­
ess, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1999). 
17. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
18. Chevron is based on an implied delegation theory; courts are to defer to agency in­
terpretation of statutes because "Congress has told them to do so." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 
2084 (emphasis removed). See also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A 
precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative 
authority."). When has such a delegation of interpretive authority occurred? That is an open 
question. When Congress has conferred substantive rulemaking authority on the agency, it is 
widely acknowledged that such a delegation of interpretive authority has occurred. See Colin 
S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 593-95 
(1985); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
199 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2093. Some, however, insist that the presence of statu­
tory ambiguity or silence in an agency-administered statute is itself an implicit delegation of 
interpretive authority. The most prominent supporter of this view is Justice Scalia. See 
Scalia, supra note 4, at 516. This view, however, has been criticized. See, e.g. , Duffy, supra, at 
189-210. 
19. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
20. Id. 
21. For a discussion and criticism of the "textualist" approach, see Bradford C. Mank, 
Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, 
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Lower courts (and the academic literature) debated whether the 
"mitigating measures" question posed by the ADA could be resolved 
at Step One of Chevron.22 In Sutton v. United Air Lines,23 the Tenth 
Circuit asserted that it could, holding that the language of the ADA 
clearly states that disability determinations are to take into account 
the effects of any mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the in­
dividual.24 The Tenth Circuit rejected the EEOC's contrary view, pub­
lished in the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance.25 After granting certio­
rari to hear Sutton v. United Air Lines, the Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Justice O'Connor, affirmed the Tenth Circuit and held that 
an impairment must be assessed in its mitigated state.26 
As a matter of substantive law, the Sutton Court's narrow interpre­
tation of the definition of disability is troubling, particularly in the 
context of workplace discrimination.27 The employment provisions of 
the ADA, located in Title I, protect only those disabled persons who 
can perform the essential functions of their jobs.28 Often it is the miti-
Legislative Authority and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527 (1997-98); Pierce, 
supra note 4, at 752, 754-62. 
22. See supra note 15; see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (advocating deference to 
EEOC Guidance); Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575 (1998) 
(finding language of the ADA unambiguously requires consideration of mitigating meas­
ures); Thais Hernandez, An Application of the Chevron Doctrine to the EEOC's Interpreta­
tion of the ADA: Why Mitigating Measures Must Be Considered When Evaluating A Disabil­
ity, 7 U. MIAMI Bus. L. J. 309 (1999) (contending that an impairment should be assessed in 
its mitigated state); Bridges, supra note 16, at 1073 (arguing for resolution of the mitigating 
measures issue at Step One of Chevron); Isaac S. Greaney, Note, The Practical Impossibility 
of Considering the Effect of Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267 (1999) (advocating following Guidance); Sheryl Rebecca 
Kamholz, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Advocating Judicial Deference to the 
EEOC's Mitigating Measures Guidelines, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 99 (1998) (urging courts to 
defer to guidelines at Chevron's Step Two); Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain 
Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled 
Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1998) (finding statutory language unambiguous); 
Recent Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2456-61 (1998) (urging deference to EEOC Guid­
ance on mitigating measures). 
23. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997). 
24. See id. at 902. 
25. Id. 
26. 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999). The reasoning in Sutton was then applied in Murphy v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999) and Albertson 's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 
U.S. 555, 565 (1999). 
27. Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to 
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined 
as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per­
form the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
538 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:532 
gating measure that enables an individual to do her work. Under 
Sutton, mitigating measures that would otherwise have brought the in­
dividual within the ADA's Title I protections against employment dis­
crimination will now often keep her outside the scope of the ADA al­
together.29 
At least as troubling, however, is the Court's refusal to defer to the 
EEOC's statutory interpretation. As EEOC Vice-Chair Paul Igasaki 
observed, in response to the Court's Sutton decision, "[W]hen the Su­
preme Court 'respectfully disagrees' with the EEOC, that has an im­
pact."30 Not only is the EEOC's influence on the substantive law of 
employment discrimination reduced, but the agency's credibility is 
likewise compromised. 
The Sutton Court's refusal to defer to the EEOC, however, raises 
questions that transcend both the EEOC's credibility and the substan­
tive law of employment discrimination. Sutton was a case at the inter­
section of administrative and discrimination law, presenting a vehicle 
for exploring a number of unanswered questions about the Chevron 
doctrine. First, Sutton presented an opportunity for the Court to con­
sider the role of administrative agencies in determining the scope of 
government programs for the disabled. The Court previously had rec­
ognized that determining legal protections for the disabled is a task for 
which the judiciary is not well-suited.31 In Sutton, however, the Court 
ignored both the EEOC's and the Attorney General's opinions in de­
termining the scope of ADA protections. Second, Sutton also pre­
sented an opportunity for the Court to explore whether deference on 
matters of employment discrimination, matters that involve some of 
this country's most deeply pressing social problems, are appropriate 
for Chevron analysis. Perhaps the Sutton result signifies the Court's 
reluctance to surrender interpretive authority to an administrative 
agency when confronting statutes aimed at implementing civil rights. 
Third, although the Court has been inconsistent in its application of 
sires." Id. 
29. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As noted by Arlene Mayerson, 
an attorney for the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, " '[i]t doesn't make any 
sense' to consider ADA plaintiffs in their corrected state if employers rejected them because 
of their uncorrected conditions." Susan J. McGolrick, Supreme Court's Three ADA Deci­
sions Disappoint Disability Rights Advocates, 68 U.S. L. Wk. 2035 (1999). 
30. Lois Rose, Disabilities Discrimination: Attorneys from Many Sides React to Trio of 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 154 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-3 (August 11, 1999). Pre­
sumably, Mr. Igasaki was talking about the negative impact that Sutton would have on the 
EEOC's credibility and status with the courts. 
31. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to apply 
heightened scrutiny to protect the mentally disabled). As the Cleburne Court stated, "How 
this large and diversified group (i.e. the mentally disabled] is to be treated under the law is a 
difficult and often technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified pro­
fessionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary." Id. at 442-43. 
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Chevron,32 the interpretive methodology the Court used to resolve the 
Sutton case at Chevron's Step One reflects an intent to imprint the 
Court's own meaning on ambiguous statutory language. This judicial 
activism at Chevron's Step One is at odds with the deference to agency 
interpretation that the Chevron doctrine symbolizes. 33 
Taking apart the deference questions presented in Sutton and its 
companion cases allows exploration of the role that administrative 
agencies should play in developing solutions to some of this country's 
most intractable problems, while also highlighting various ambiguities 
in the Chevron doctrine itself.· Part II discusses the various types of ju­
dicial deference to agency decisionmaking that a court might apply to 
administrative agencies. Part III examines the EEOC's statutory 
authority under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, and the degree 
of deference that courts have historically accorded to EEOC interpre­
tations of these statutes. Part IV examines the Court's holding in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines and reviews the options available to it for 
extending or withholding deference to the EEOC. Part V takes a step 
back from the case law and reflects on the appropriate roles of ad­
ministrative agencies and courts in implementing civil rights in general 
and in setting policies for the disabled in particular. Part VI suggests 
how best to resolve the question of deference to the EEOC's regula­
tions and Interpretive Guidance addressing Title I of the ADA, an is­
sue the Court eventually will have to confront. Part VII concludes that 
jurisprudential and policy considerations strongly favor judicial defer­
ence to the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA. 
II. THE VARIOUS PERMUTATIONS OF DEFERENCE 
In discussing deference to agency interpretations of statutes, it is 
helpful first to define what deference means and why it matters. Def­
erence to an agency's interpretations of law can come in three forms. 
Sometimes, deference means a reviewing court will consider the views 
of an agency and may find those views persuasive, but the court will 
retain for itself the ultimate interpretive power.34 The court essentially 
32. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 750, 776-78. 
33. The Court's decision in Sutton has been harshly criticized as result-oriented juris­
prudence. In an address to the ABA shortly after the decisions were handed down, Professor 
Harry F. Tepker, Jr., stated, "It is difficult to understand how the Court could conclude the 
Act need not protect amputees, persons suffering from myopia, high blood pressure, or 
other conditions merely because science has provided some amelioration for their undis­
puted physical shortcomings . . . .  The outcome . . .  is not textualism. It is judicial activism in 
service of judicial skepticism." Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Writing the Law of Work on Nero's Pil­
lars: The 1998-99 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 LAB. LAW. 181, 196-97 (1999). For 
other works criticizing the substantive result in Sutton, see Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA 
to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071 (1999); 
Luther Sutter, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Road Now Too Narrow, 22 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 161 (2000). 
34. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976) (finding EEOC's inter-
540 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:532 
treats the agency's opinion as it would the opinion of an expert wit­
ness.35 This form of deference is often described as Skidmore defer­
ence, in reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co.36 In Skidmore, the Court held that the interpretations of 
an agency, which lacked power to issue substantive regulations, could 
nonetheless have the "power to persuade, if lacking power to con­
trol."37 
Deference to an administrative agency under Chevron means 
something more. If a court is reviewing an agency's interpretation of 
its governing statute and the court concludes at Chevron's Step One 
that Congress has not spoken to the question presented, Chevron's 
Step Two requires the court to accept the agency's interpretation so 
long as it is reasonable, even if the court disagrees with the agency's 
interpretation.38 Chevron-styled deference has been described as 
"meaningful deference," as it mandates "administrative displacement 
of judicial judgment."39 The decision has been labeled both "evolu­
tionary and revolutionary"40 because it finds in silent or ambiguous 
statutes a delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies charged 
with the administration and enforcement of those statutes.41 
pretation unpersuasive). 
35. See Diver, supra note 18, at 565; see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Inter­
pretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1990). 
36. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). At issue before the Court in Skidmore was the appropriate 
weight to attach to "rulings, interpretations and opinions" of the Wage-Hour Administrator, 
who lacked power to issue substantive regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 
140. 
37. Id. at 140. An agency's interpretation may persuade the Court, depending upon the 
"thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all [other] factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control." Id. 
38. This distinction has been described as follows: 
As a matter of practical judicial psychology, it may often make little operational difference 
whether an interpretation is reviewed independently but given Skidmore consideration or is 
reviewed for reasonableness under Chevron Step 2. But the conceptual difference is large. 
An interpretation subject to the limited review of Chevron's Step 2 binds the court - and 
therefore is law - unless it can be found unreasonable. The agency thus makes law. 
Anthony, supra note 35, at 40. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between the Skid­
more and Chevron review standards, see 1 KENNETH C. DA VIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 239-47 (3d ed. 1994). 
39. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1983). 
40. Starr, supra note 4, at 284. 
41. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984). As recently noted by the Court, "Deference under Chevron to an agency's construc­
tion of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity con­
stitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps." 
Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
Chevron's significance derives from its recognition of an implied delegation of interpretive 
authority. As noted by one scholar, "Chevron's importance lay in its adoption of a categori-
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In contrast to the Skidmore and Chevron brands of deference, 
Seminole Rock deference attributes the greatest weight to agency de­
terminations.42 Seminole Rock deference means that an agency's inter­
pretation of its own regulations are conclusive and binding on the 
courts, so long as the agency's interpretation is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious.43 
Both the Skidmore and Seminole Rock forms of deference have 
been accepted components of administrative law since the 1940s. Nei­
ther form has proved particularly controversial. Skidmore deference 
does not displace the judicial authority to interpret ambiguous statutes 
independently, and Seminole Rock deference does not implicate statu­
tory interpretation at all. Chevron, in contrast, has proved controver­
sial from the outset, as it potentially serves as a "kind of Marbury, or 
counter-Marbury, for the administrative state." 44 But the extent to 
which Chevron actually results in agencies, not courts, supplying statu­
tory meaning ultimately depends on how the Court applies Chevron's 
first step. Disagreement exists within the Court on how courts should 
determine whether Congress expressed a clear intent on the interpre­
tive question presented. 
Under Step One of Chevron, a reviewing court, when confronting 
a question of statutory construction, will first ask whether the statute 
directly speaks to the precise question at issue.45 If it does, the court 
gives effect to the statute's plain meaning, obviating any need to de­
cide whether or not to defer to an administrative agency's interpreta­
tion.46 When Congress itself has resolved the policy choice before it, 
then no delegation of interpretive authority, to the courts or to the 
agency, has occurred. 
cal presumption that silence or ambiguity in an agency-administered statute should be un­
derstood as an implicit delegation of authority to the agency." John F. Manning, Constitu­
tional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 623 (1996). Professor Manning credits Chevron with establishing a 
"new default presumption" for statutory interpretation. Id. at 625. 
It is not clear, however, whether statutory silence or ambiguity alone is enough to sup­
port an inference of a delegation of interpretive authority or whether some independent in­
dicia of an implied delegation, such as an express delegation of substantive rulemaking 
power, also is required. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 190-204 (1992). For extended dis­
cussion of this point, see Duffy, supra note 18, at 189-90, and White, supra note 2, at 76-87. 
42. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). For a critique of the 
Seminole Rock doctrine, see Manning, supra note 41. 
43. In deciding how a regulation should be construed, "the ultimate criterion is the ad­
ministrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly errone­
ous or inconsistent with the regulation." Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
44. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2075 (referring to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803)). 
45. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
46. Id. at 842-43. 
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This first step of Chevron has proved to be the all-important step.47 
If a statute is "clear," no deference is due to agency interpretations. 
But how "clear" must a statute be for a case to be resolved at Chev­
ron's Step One?48 Three years after Chevron, the Court applied a 
Chevron analysis in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.49 In an opinion by Chev­
ron's author, Justice Stevens, the Cardoza-Fonseca Court engaged in 
an expansive search for statutory meaning at Step One. Justice Stev­
ens examined both the "ordinary meaning" of the statutory language 
and employed "traditional tools of statutory construction," including 
legislative history, to determine whether Congress expressed a clear 
intent on the issue presented. 50 
Such an expansive approach to statutory interpretation at Chev­
ron's first step gives courts considerable room to flesh out statutory 
meaning. Justice Scalia, an outspoken critic of judicial activism, criti­
cized the Cardoza-Fonseca majority for subverting the deferential in­
tent of Chevron by increasing the stringency of the Step One test.51 
Ironically, however, application of Justice Scalia's own "textualist" 
approach to statutory interpretation, which eschews the use of legisla­
tive history and assumes that legislative texts contain a "plain mean­
ing," increases the likelihood52 that the Court will resolve Chevron 
cases at Step One.53 As Justice Scalia has candidly explained, a judge 
who follows a textualist approach to statutory construction rarely will 
need to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, for such a judge 
more often than not will find the answer to the question being asked in 
47. That such would be the case was recognized from the outset. Starr, supra note 4, at 
298 (identifying Chevron's first step as "the primary battleground on which litigation over 
agency interpretations [will be] fought"). In an article published eight years after Chevron 
was decided, Professor Thomas Merrill identified the Court's expansive approach to Step 
One of Chevron, an approach that permitted the Court, notwithstanding the Chevron opin­
ion, to declare statutory meaning. Merrill, supra note 4, at 990. This is a trend that has esca­
lated. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 750, 752 (noting that the Court rarely reaches Step Two of 
Chevron). 
48. As Justice Scalia has noted: 
Here, of course, is the chink in Chevron's armor - the ambiguity that prevents it from being 
an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions (though still a better one that what was 
supplanted). How clear is clear? It is here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future bat­
tles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought. 
Scalia, supra note 4, at 520-21. 
49. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
50. Id. at 432-49. 
51. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Justice Stevens had acknowledged that even when the plain language of a statute 
appears to settle an interpretive question, legislative history should still be consulted to en­
sure that Congress in fact meant what it appears to have said. Id. at 432 n.12. 
53. Mank, supra note 21, at 527 (describing Scalia as having "led a revival of textualist 
statutory interpretation on the Court"). See also Pierce, supra note 4, at 779 (suggesting that 
Justice Scalia's ego renders him reluctant to find a statutory puzzle he cannot solve). 
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the statute itself.s4 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's activist ap­
proaches to Chevron's Step One have trickled down to the lower 
courts.ss 
At issue in the Sutton case was which form of deference - Skid­
more, Seminole Rock, or Chevron - if any, was due the EEOC's In­
terpretive Guidance on mitigating measures.s6 The Court deflected 
this issues7 by employing a textualist approach to find "plain meaning" 
and clear congressional intent in the ADA. 
Does Sutton signal that the Supreme Court is becoming increas­
ingly uncomfortable with Chevron deference and, as a result, has 
committed itself to resolving Chevron cases at Step One? Or is there 
something about the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the polar­
izing yet important policy questions it broadly addresses, that makes 
the Court particularly uneasy with the specific question of deference 
to the EEOC? Alternatively, was the particular interpretive issue in 
Sutton, or the format in which the agency's interpretation was issued, a 
reason for failing to defer to the agency's interpretation? Each of 
these questions is explored below. 
III. THE EEOC AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A threshold issue, which the EEOC and Justice Department ig­
nored in their brief to the Court, is whether the EEOC is an agency 
whose statutory interpretations are entitled to Chevron review. The 
EEOC simply assumed Chevron would apply. The Court, however, 
has been reluctant to apply Chevron review to the EEOC's interpreta­
tions of the statutes it administers, most notably Title VII. Thus, 
whether the EEOC is an agency that deserves Chevron deference is a 
question that merits examination. 
A. Chevron and the EEOC 
Why might the Court believe the EEOC is an agency whose views 
are worth less than those of other agencies charged with administering 
statutes? Asking this question forces a brief examination of why courts 
54. Scalia, supra note 4, at 24; see also Mank, supra note 21, at 575-76, 585-86 (noting 
textualists are less likely to defer to agency under Chevron). 
55. See Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
56. Compare Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), with Arnold v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir. 1998) (extending only Skidmore defer­
ence to EEOC's Interpretive Guidance); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 763 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1997) (debating whether Skidmore or Seminole Rock form of deference should <:iP­
ply to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Mitigating Measures); Harris v. H & W Con­
tracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996) (extending Chevron deference to the Inter­
pretive Guidance). 
57. "Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these interpretive guidelines, 
we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480. 
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should defer to an administrative agency's construction of a statute it 
administers, or, more specifically, why the Supreme Court has said 
that they should. It also requires an examination of how the EEOC 
has fared when measured against these reasons. 
As the Supreme Court recently explained, "deference is justified 
because '[t)he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the 
public interest are not judicial ones,' and because . . . the agency[] 
[has] greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circum­
stances surrounding the subjects regulated."58 Importantly, the Court 
has recognized that the Chevron doctrine is based on an implied dele­
gation theory; courts defer to an agency's construction of a silent or 
ambiguous statute because Congress has directed them to do so.59 That 
the Chevron doctrine, at bottom, is based on a congressional delega­
tion of interpretive authority has been widely recognized, although of­
ten criticized.60 
Of course, such congressional direction often does not exist in so 
many words,61 and the circumstances under which such an implied 
delegation may be found has been a source of controversy under 
Chevron.62 The Court's prior treatment of the question of deference to 
the EEOC under Title VII and the ADEA nicely illustrates the uncer­
tainties surrounding this question. 
58. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984)). 
59. "Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it adminis­
ters is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation 
from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps." Id. at 159. See also Adams Fruit 
Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). See Herz, supra note 41, at 199; Sunstein, supra note 
4, at 2084. As explained by Professor Monaghan: 
[A] court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to 'say what the law is' by deferring to 
agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as 'made' by the authorized law­
making entity. Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the 
interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making 
authority. 
Monaghan, supra note 39, at 27-28. 
60. See Anthony, supra note 35, at 4-6; Duffy, supra note 18, at 189-203; Kmiec, supra 
note 4, at 277-279; Merrill, supra note 4, at 979. 
61. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 370 (1986); Scalia, supra note 4, at 517. 
62. As noted by Professor Anthony, deciding whether interpretive authority has been 
delegated "may be the most vexing of the many uncertainties left by Chevron." Anthony, 
supra note 35, at 32. This uncertainty continues. See Duffy, supra note 18, at 189 (describing 
two views of Chevron: one that would find an implied delegation of interpretive authority 
from statutory ambiguity using the "common law" reasoning of Chevron and another that 
would find a delegation only from the delegation of substantive rulemaking authority). 
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1. The Title VII Background 
Over the years, the amount of deference due to the EEOC has 
been in question.63 Most of the Court's experience with the EEOC has 
been in connection with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, 
sex, color, religion, and national origin.64 Importantly, Congress did 
not confer substantive rulemaking authority on the EEOC with re­
spect to Title VII. 
In the early years of Title VII's enforcement, the Court paid "great 
deference" to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VIl.65 Even as late as 
1988, in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co.,66 the Court had de­
ferred to an EEOC procedural regulation, even though the Court ac­
knowledged the agency's interpretation may not have been the most 
natural one.67 In deferring to the agency, the Court stated, "it is axio­
matic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has 
primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by 
grammatical or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpreta­
tion of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to 
deference."68 Although the Court did not cite Chevron, it plainly had 
applied Chevron's "meaningful deference" approach.69 
But in 1991 in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMC0),70 
the Court refused to defer to the EEOC's view, reflected in a series of 
informal documents, that Title VII may be applied extraterritorially. 
Although the Court found the statutory language ambiguous, it re­
fused to defer to the EEOC, citing Skidmore.71 Justice Scalia disagreed 
with the Court's approach, insisting that the EEOC, despite its lack of 
63. For a more extended discussion of the Supreme Court's approach to the EEOC's 
statutory interpretations, see White, supra note 2, at 63, 71-76, and Moot, supra note 3, at 
222-31. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). By 1976, however, the Court 
backed away from this approach. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court rejected an 
interpretive guideline equating discrimination on the basis of pregnancy with sex discrimina­
tion. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In dismissing the agency's views, the Court noted that the EEOC 
had not been given the authority to issue substantive legislative rules and thus its guidelines 
were entitled to "less weight" from the courts. Id. at 141. The EEOC would receive only 
Skidmore deference, said the Court, which meant its regulations had only the power to per­
suade. Id. at 141-42 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). See supra notes 
34-37 and accompanying text for a description of Skidmore deference. 
66. 486 U.S. 1 07 (1988). 
67. Id. at 114-15.  
68. Id. at 115 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v.  Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979)). 
69. See Arabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U.S. at 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing 
that the Commercial Office Products Court had applied a Chevron analysis). 
70. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
71. Id. at 257-58. 
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substantive rulemaking authority, was entitled to the benefit of Chev­
ron analysis.72 Justice Scalia complained that the juxtaposition of 
Commercial Office Products with the majority's approach in 
ARAMCO left "the state of the law regarding deference to the 
EEOC . . .  unsettled,"73 and he called for application of Chevron 
analysis when reviewing the agency's statutory interpretations.74 
Although the law remains unsettled on this point, there is an im­
portant distinction between the Commercial Office Products and 
ARAMCO cases. Commercial Office Products involved a procedural 
regulation issued by the EEOC,75 and Title VII expressly confers on 
the agency the authority to promulgate procedural regulations.76 The 
delegation of rulemaking powers is widely acknowledged to support 
an implied delegation of interpretive authority.77 Thus, it is possible to 
reconcile the results in the Title VII cases based on the rulemaking 
powers expressly conferred on or withheld from the agency by Con­
gress.78 The EEOC was delegated authority to issue procedural rules 
under Title VII,79 while the power to issue substantive rules was not 
granted.80 Thus, under this view, Chevron deference to the EEOC's 
procedural rules would be appropriate, while Chevron deference to 
the agency's interpretations of the statute's substantive provisions 
would not.81 
72. Id. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
73. Id. at 260. 
74. Id. at 259-60. Justice Scalia's urging that a Chevron analysis should govern the 
EEO C's interpretations of Title VII at first glance may seem surprising. However, since Jus­
tice Scalia rarely encounters a statute from which he cannot tease a plain meaning, it is rare 
for him to be in the position of deferring to an administrative agency's construction of a stat­
ute it administers. See Mank, supra note 21, at 590. Thus, he can call for broad application of 
Chevron, knowing he rarely will find himself at Step Two of that analysis. Of course, Scalia 
himself recognizes this point. Scalia, supra note 4, at 521. 
75. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107, 109-19 (1988). 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1994). 
77. See DA VIS & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 119-20; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2092-93. 
Professor Duffy believes that a grant of substantive rulemaking authority reconciles Chevron 
with the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement of notice and comment. If an agency 
has substantive rulemaking authority, then Congress has delegated the agency the authority 
to issue interpretations of statutory provisions. Duffy, supra note 18, at 189-204. 
78. See Duffy, supra note 18, at 203-04; White, supra note 2, at 93. But see Martini v. 
Federal Nat'I Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding clear meaning at Step 
One of Chevron but expressing doubt over whether Chevron review applies to EEOC pro­
cedural regulations). 
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
80. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). 
81. Two recent Title VII decisions further cloud the issue of the EEOC's entitlement to 
deference under that statute. In Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter. , 519 U.S. 202 (1997), 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, appeared to retreat from his claim that the 
EEOC is deserving of Chevron deference under Title VII. Walters asked the Court to decide 
how to count employees in determining whether Title VII's jurisdictional standards have 
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Whether the Court will defer to the EEOC's interpretations under 
Title VII may turn on whether a procedural or substantive question is 
at issue.82 If so, the Supreme Court may have become accustomed to 
been met. Id. at 204. Although the Court agreed with the EEOC's position that persons 
should be counted on each day an "employment relationship" exists, id. at 206, it did so 
without reference to Chevron. Moreover, Scalia expressly noted that the EEOC "lacks 
rulemaking authority over the issue," id. at 207, a suggestion that has been read as a backing 
away from his position in ARAMCO. See Duffy, supra note 18, at 204. 
Walters, however, may also be read as a decision resolved at Step One of Chevron, a 
reading in keeping with Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation. The Walters 
Court apparently found the statutory language clear and unambiguous, invoking various dic­
tionaries in support of its view of the statute's ordinary meaning. Resolving the case at Step 
One of Chevron, as Scalia appeared to do, sidestepped any need to decide what level of def­
erence the agency's interpretation of the statute was due. See id. 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337 (1997), decided the same Term as Walters, is 
more difficult. The question presented in Robinson was whether or not a former employee is 
protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. Id. at 339. Justice Thomas, writing for a 
unanimous Court, began by asking whether the statute had a plain and unambiguous mean­
ing, which is the first step in a Chevron analysis. He found it did not; the statute's reference 
to "employees" was ambiguous. If the EEOC were deserving of Chevron deference, the 
question would then have been whether the agency's interpretation of the statute was a rea­
sonable one. But the Court did not ask that question. It instead went on to independently 
interpret the statute, finding that former employees are indeed within the statute's reach. Id. 
at 345-46. 
Does the Court's independent search for statutory meaning in Robinson mean the 
EEOC is not entitled to Chevron deference under Title VII? Not exactly. The EEOC's view 
of the statute had been presented only in an amicus brief, not in a formal format, such as a 
procedural rule or an interpretive guideline. While the Court quoted the agency's brief with 
approval, it may have been unwilling to extend Chevron deference to substantive interpreta­
tions of the statute put forward without benefit of rulemaking procedures. Thus, Robinson, 
like Walters, leaves unresolved what level of the deference the agency is due under Title VII. 
But see Donna P. Fenn, Note, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Providing Former Employees with 
Protection From Retaliation, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 539, 565 (1998) (Robinson illus­
trates the benefits of deference to the EEOC interpreting Title VII). 
82. Many embrace the view that the Chevron analysis does not apply to the EEOC's 
interpretations of Title VII because the EEOC lacks substantive rulemaking authority. See 
DA VIS & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 119-22, 235-36; Duffy, supra note 18, at 204; Sunstein, 
supra note 4, at 2093; Jamie A. Yavelberg, Comment, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Ju­
dicial Deference to Agency Interpretation After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 190-
91 (1992). Others, most prominently Justice Scalia, view statutory ambiguity as a grant of 
interpretive authority to the administrative agency charged with administering the statute 
and thus would apply Chevron to the EEOC. Scalia, supra note 4, at 516; ARAMCO, 499 
U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
My own view is more nuanced. I do agree with the prevailing view that a grant of sub­
stantive rulemaking powers to an agency constitutes a presumptive delegation of interpre­
tive authority. But I do not agree that such a grant should be considered an absolute requi­
site for finding a delegation of interpretive authority. Rather, when substantive rulemaking 
authority does not exist, a reviewing court, without indulging any presumption in favor of 
the agency, should examine the particular legislation to decide whether an implied grant of 
interpretive authority is appropriate in the context of that statute. Viewing Title VII as a 
whole, I conclude that a delegation of interpretive authority to the EEOC should be found. 
White, supra note 2, at 79-87, 92-102. See also Diver, supra note 18, at 593-95. For other arti­
cles advocating an examination of statutory context in determining whether a delegation of 
statutory interpretive authority has been made, see Breyer, supra note 61, at 370-71; Kevin 
W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for 
Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 358-60; and Braun, supra note 4, at 994. I do not 
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putting its own imprint on employment discrimination law under Title 
VII, looking to the agency's interpretations merely as useful input to 
be considered by the Court in its own independent interpretation of 
the statute.83 
2. Deference to the EEOC Under the ADEA 
The EEOC is also responsible for the administration and enforce­
ment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.84 Importantly, 
however, Congress granted the EEOC both substantive and proce­
dural rulemaking authority under that statute.85 Thus, if a grant of sub­
stantive rulemaking authority is the necessary predicate for Chevron 
review, that predicate has been met under the ADEA. 
In Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts in 1989,86 the 
EEOC claimed entitlement to Chevron deference and asked the Court 
to defer to its regulation interpreting the term "subterfuge" in the 
ADEA.87 The Court refused to defer after finding the agency's inter­
pretation at odds with the "plain language" of the statute.BB Betts thus 
appears to have been decided at Step One of Chevron, although the 
case is not absolutely clear on this point. The Court, importantly, did 
not dispute the applicability of Chevron review to the agency's ADEA 
interpretations. 
On one other occasion, the EEOC has pressed a claim to Chevron 
deference under the ADEA. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,89 the EEOC con­
tended that appointed state court judges were covered by the ADEA, 
a point of view rejected by the Court.90 The agency's position in 
Ashcroft, however, had been articulated only in the course of litiga­
tion, rather than in an interpretive format following notice and com­
ment. 91 
agree with Justice Scalia, however, that statutory ambiguity, standing alone, creates a pre­
sumption that interpretive authority has been delegated when an agency has not been dele­
gated substantive rulemaking or adjudicatory powers. White, supra note 2, at 86-87. 
83. See Colker, supra note 22, at 139-40; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? 
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV., 613, 664 (1991) 
(noting the Court "imposes its own preferences onto civil rights statutes"). 
84. 29 u.s.c. § 626 (1994). 
85. 29 u.s.c. § 628 (1994). 
86. 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
87. Id. at 170-72. 
88. Id. at 171. 
89. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
90. Id. at 488. 
91. See id. at 485 n.3 (White, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the format issue, 
see infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. 
December 2000] Deference and Disability Discrimination 549 
The Supreme Court decided Sutton against this background. The 
Court had become accustomed under both Title VII and the ADEA, 
but particularly under Title VII, to interpreting independently the 
statutes the EEOC administers. The EEOC's lack of authority to 
promulgate substantive regulations under Title VII, the statute with 
which the agency has been most closely identified, has fostered a per­
ception that the EEOC is a weak agency.92 The agency's "never-never 
land status"93 under Title VII may well explain the Court's reluctance 
to recognize the EEOC as a major player in the interpretation of the 
ADA.94 However, the EEOC's claim to deference under Title I of the 
ADA stands on different, and stronger, footing.95 
3. Deference to the EEOC Under the ADA 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, when the Chevron doctrine 
was a well-recognized component of the administrative law landscape. 
Perhaps the most important employment discrimination statute en­
acted since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADA provides protection 
in the public and private sectors from disability-based discrimination 
in a variety of settings, including public services provided by state and 
local government, public accommodations provided by private enti­
ties, and transportation.% Most important for present purposes, Title I 
of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against a quali­
fied individual with a disability.97 
92. Colker, supra note 22, at 135-36, 39; see also Neal Devins, Political Will and the Uni­
tary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
273, 292 (1993) (EEOC has been viewed as a weak agency); White, supra note 2, at 56 (not­
ing longstanding perception of agency's weakness as compared to other agencies). 
93. Devins, supra note 92, at 296. 
94. Even prior to Sutton, lower courts had paid little attention to the EEOC's regula­
tions under the ADA. See Michael Higgins, No Sudden Impact: Courts Rejecting Mental Dis­
ability Claims Despite EEOC Guidelines Intended to Protect Mentally Ill, ABA J., Nov. 1997, 
at 24. (As of September 1997, no judge had cited guidelines in any opinion). As noted by one 
commentator, "The EEOC's ADA regulations have been a victim of the agency's historic 
second-class status; the courts continue to disregard its regulations and guidance, even when 
a very strong case can be made that Congress intended courts to give deference to those 
rules under the ADA." Colker, supra note 22, at 135-36, 139. See Wern, supra note 3, at 
1578. 
95. For an expanded discussion of the points set forth below, see White, supra note 2, at 
89-92. 
96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). There is some uncertainty over whether Title 
II of the ADA, which prohibits disability-based discrimination in public services, may be 
used to combat employment discrimination by entities covered by Title II. Compare 
Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1999), petition for 
cert. filed (No. 97-36101) (refusing employment claims under Title II) with Bledsoe v. Palm 
Beach County Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 818 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998) (allowing employment claims under Title II). 
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The substantive provisions of Title I, as well as the definition of 
disability that applies to each of the ADA's titles, were derived pri­
marily from experience under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.98 That 
statute prohibited discrimination against the handicapped by the fed­
eral government, federal contractors, and those receiving federal fi­
nancial assistance. The ADA comprehensively extended these prohi­
bitions to private and public sector employers. The ADA not only 
borrows language from the Rehabilitation Act - and from case law 
and regulations interpreting and applying it - the ADA also ex­
pressly provides that it shall not "be construed to apply a lesser stan­
dard than the standards applied under . . .  the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to [it.)"99 
Thus, experience under the Rehabilitation Act was to inform interpre­
tation of the ADA.100 
The procedural provisions of Title I of the ADA, however, were 
imported from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title l's en­
forcement scheme expressly incorporates the enforcement provisions 
of Title VII, thus making a charge with the EEOC a prerequisite to 
suit under Title I of the ADA.101 
Importantly, Title I of the ADA contains the following provision: 
"Not later than 1 year after July 26, 1990, the Commission [EEOC) 
shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this sub­
chapter in accordance with [the Administrative Procedure Act) ."102 
The EEOC fulfilled that mandate, issuing extensive regulations after 
notice and comment,103 accompanied by an appendix providing an In­
terpretive Guidance.104 A Technical Assistance Manual also was issued 
by the agency.105 Much of the agency's work product focused on the 
definition of a "disability" for purposes of Title I of the ADA.106 
98. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). 
100. As noted by the Supreme Court, "The directive requires us to construe the ADA 
to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Reha­
bilitation Act." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998). 
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). Title I further provides a claim for a violation of the 
EEOC's regulations: 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [Title VII) shall be the powers, remedies, 
and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to 
any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of 
this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning em­
ployment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). 
103. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (1999). 
104. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (1999). 
105. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS 
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Against this background, the EEOC had a well-founded expecta­
tion that its statutory interpretations would receive Chevron defer­
ence. First, as mentioned above, Congress had . granted the EEOC 
both substantive and procedural rulemaking authority under the 
ADA.107 If this is the sine qua non of a delegation of interpretive 
authority,108 the agency has it. Second, Congress conferred this 
authority on the agency in the post-Chevron era; Congress knows (or 
should know) that conferring rulemaking authority and/or enacting 
ambiguous statutes constitutes an implied (or explicit) delegation of 
interpretive authority.109 Third, Congress directed the agency to have 
its regulations in place one year before the ADA's effective date,110 
evincing an understanding that the agency would give meaningful 
guidance to employers and individuals concerning their respective re­
sponsibilities and rights.111 Fourth, the statute provides a cause of ac­
tion for violation of the EEOC's regulations, an acknowledgment of 
the agency's lawmaking powers.112 And finally, the statute requires 
charging parties to exhaust administrative procedures with the EEOC 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992). 
106. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)-(1), 1630.3 (1999). The Regulations and Interpretive Guid­
ance explicitly stated that they were issued for the purpose of implementing Title I of the 
ADA as it pertains "to the employment of qualified individuals with disabilities." 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.l(a) (1999). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) ("Not later than one year July 26, 1990, the Commission 
shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter in accordance with 
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5."). 
108. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
109. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) ("But Congress is well 
aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the imple­
menting agency."); see also Manning, supra note 41, at 625 (Chevron "significantly revised 
the interpretive background against which Congress legislates."); Scalia, supra note 4, at 517 
(stating that Congress now knows, when it legislates, that statutory ambiguities will be re­
solved by agencies, not courts). 
110. 42 u.s.c. § 12116. 
111. As noted by the EEOC and Solicitor General in their amicus curiae brief to the 
Court in Murphy v. UPS: 
Deference to administrative agency views is especially appropriate here, as the EEOC and 
the Department of Justice "played a pivotal role in 'setting [the statutory] machinery in mo­
tion.' " Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980). When agencies promul­
gate their regulations virtually contemporaneously with a statute's enactment, utilizing the 
insights they derived from their participation in the legislative process, the rationale for 
granting deference is heightened. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 
U.S. 472, 477 (1979); United States v. Sheffield Bd. Of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978); 
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877). 
Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitio'ler at 19-20, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 
(1999) (No. 97-1992). See also Colker, supra note 22, at 134 (arguing the regulations were 
promulgated under circumstances normally afforded the "highest judicial deference"). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). 
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before bringing suit;113 the EEOC is responsible for investigating and 
conciliating discrimination claims and also has the power to prosecute 
alleged violations.114 Statutory interpretation is necessary in perform­
ing these tasks, supporting the conclusion that Congress intended the 
agency to give meaning to the statute's gaps and ambiguities.U5 Ac­
cordingly, the case for an implied delegation of interpretive authority 
to the EEOC under Title I of the ADA is compelling. 
Scholars critical of the view that courts should defer to the EEOC 
note that Congress did not confer on the agency cease and desist pow­
ers, instead providing for de novo trials in all employment discrimina­
tion suits.116 Moreover, critics note that prosecutorial authority under 
Title I of the ADA, as is true for both Title VII and the ADEA, is 
shared with the Attorney General. While the EEOC may bring suit 
against private employers, it is the Attorney General who may sue 
governmental employers for employment discrimination.117 
But these statutory provisions do not defeat the view that Congress 
made an implied delegation of interpretive authority to the EEOC. A 
grant of interpretive authority is not inconsistent with de novo litiga­
tion. An agency's interpretive regulation, issued following notice and 
comment procedures, is its view of what a statute means. Whether the 
statute, as interpreted by the agency, has been violated under the par­
ticular facts and circumstances of the case is the stuff of litigation.118 
Thus, that parties have a right to a trial de novo under the ADA is 




115. See White, supra note 2, at 96. 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). The ADA simply incorporates Title VII's enforcement 
scheme, which requires charging parties to file charges with the agency but which permits de 
novo litigation in state or federal court after receiving a right to sue letter from the agency. 
This lack of enforcement authority has contributed to perceptions of the agency as weak. See 
Devins, supra note 92, at 298. 
117. "Without cease-and-desist authority and with the Justice Department's concurrent 
authority to litigate employment discrimination actions, the EEOC was far from a prototypi­
cal independent regulatory agency." Devins, supra note 92, at 298. Additionally, as noted by 
Professor Devins, the Solicitor General represents the EEOC in proceedings before the Su­
preme Court and has "seem(ed] disinclined to allow the EEOC to advance competing argu­
ments before the Supreme Court." Id. at 290. 
118. See Duffy, supra note 18, at 210 (recognizing Chevron's applicability even when a 
private cause of action exists); White, supra note 2, at 92 ("This split enforcement scheme 
gives the agency the authority to resolve the broader policy questions left open under the 
statute while reserving to the courts the dispensing of individual justice."). 
119. Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920-22 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing that 
Congress may have wanted judiciary to determine liability while delegating to agency 
broader interpretive power). 
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Nor is a sharing of prosecutorial power with the Attorney General 
inconsistent with Chevron deference to the EEOC's statutory inter­
pretations. Indeed, such a suggestion reflects a misunderstanding of 
Chevron. Chevron does not compel deference to any agency's litigat­
ing position.120 That an agency has chosen to bring suit against an en­
tity does not mean the agency wins so long as its position is not unrea­
sonable. Rather, it is the agency's pre-existing statutory 
interpretations that are entitled to deference in the context of the liti­
gation. An agency's decision to bring suit is not an interpretive act. 
Once suit is initiated, the court (or jury) will decide whether the stat­
ute, under the facts and circumstances of the case before it, has been 
violated, as is true in the context of private litigation. 
Consequently, an analysis of the structure of the ADA, particu­
larly its grant to the EEOC of substantive and procedural rulemaking 
authority under Title I, supports the EEOC's claim to a Chevron re­
view standard.121 Even if one assumes the EEOC's lack of substantive 
rulemaking authority122 under Title VII suggests that Congress with­
held interpretive authority from the EEOC under that statute, Con­
gress's corresponding grant of substantive rulemaking authority to the 
EEOC under the ADA, along with other indicia, demonstrate that 
Congress intended the EEOC to exercise interpretive authority under 
the ADA. 
B. Defining the ADA 's Protected Class 
Although Congress recognized the need for the EEOC to issue 
substantive regulations carrying out Title I, Congress itself promul­
gated a statutory definition of disability. In language drawn "almost 
verbatim" from the Rehabilitation Act,123 the ADA defines a disability 
as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 124 
The statute thus provides three alternative routes to establishing the 
existence of a disability; an individual may be covered under one or 
more of these prongs. 
120. Merrill, supra note 4, at 987-88. 
121. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2086-87 (stating that Chevron review applies when a 
delegation of interpretive authority is the best reconstruction of congressional intent). 
122. Id. at 2093 (arguing Chevron does not apply to agencies lacking substantive rule­
making authority); DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 235-36 (same). 
123. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). 
124. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2) (1994). 
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The ADA itself does not define what constitutes an "impairment" 
or a "major life activity," nor does it define what is meant by "substan­
tially limits." The EEOC, however, devoted much attention and ex­
pertise to defining each of these terms, in both its regulations and in 
the Interpretive Guidance accompanying them.125 
Protection under Title I of the ADA does not extend to all indi­
viduals with a disability. Instead, Title l's protections, by and large, are 
limited only to qualified individuals with a disability - that is, those 
disabled persons who can perform the essential duties of their jobs.126 
Over one-half of the ADA cases to date have explored the question of 
whether a disability is present.127 Proving the existence of a disability is 
a threshold coverage issue under the ADA. Unlike Title VII, which 
extends its protections to all employees of a covered employer, the 
ADA protects from discrimination only those with a disability, as 
statutorily defined.128 Moreover, the protected class under Title I is 
even narrower, as the individual with a disability must be able to per­
form the essential functions of the job (s)he holds or desire& before 
(s)he will fall within the protected class.129 
125. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)-(l), 1630.3 (1999). 
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). A qualified individual with a disability is statuto­
rily defined as one who can perform the essential functions of the job she holds or desires 
"with or without reasonable accommodation." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Statutory 
examples of reasonable accommodations include making facilities usable by the disabled and 
"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica­
tions of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or in­
terpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. � 
12111(9)(B) (1994). An accommodation that would pose an undue hardship on an employer 
is not a reasonable one. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. I 1995). The EEOC's 
regulations and Interpretive Guidance address in depth the agency's interpretation of "es­
sential functions," "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship." 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(n)-(p) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n)-(p) (1995). 
Title I also prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual "because of the known 
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship 
or association." 42. U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994). It is has been held, moreover, that the 1 
ADA's prohibitions against pre-employment medical inquiries and disclosure of medical 
information extend to nondisabled job applicants. See Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 
188 F.3d 964, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999). 
127. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623 
(1999). 
128. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (Background) (1999). See also Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 69; 
Colker, supra note 22, at 102-03 (noting the disability definition as the key to ADA litiga­
tion). 
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
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C. Bragdon v. Abbott: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation 
Under the ADA? 
The Supreme Court first encountered the problem of determining 
what constitutes a disability under the ADA in the 1998 case of 
Bragdon v. AbbottY0 Bragdon was not an employment case; instead, it 
was brought under Title III of the ADA, which prohibits disability 
discrimination by a place of public accommodation.131 Nonetheless, it 
provides a useful background against which to examine Sutton. Both 
cases presented the Court with interpretive issues involving the 
meaning of "disability." Importantly, both cases also involved admin­
istrative guidance on the interpretive issues posed. 
Sidney Abbott, who suffered from asymptomatic HIV infection, 
claimed her dentist, Randon Bragdon, had violated the ADA by re­
fusing to fill her cavity in his office because she was HIV infected.132 
Bragdon contended that asymptomatic HIV infection was not a dis­
ability within the meaning of the ADA, reasoning that Abbott's physi­
cal impairment did not substantially limit any of her major life activi­
ties.133 The Supreme Court disagreed.134 
Justice Kennedy, writing for five justices, began by determining 
whether HIV infection was an "impairment" within the meaning of 
the ADA. In light of Congress's express directive in the ADA that 
protections under that statute were to be at least as stringent as those 
established by Rehabilitation Act regulations,135 the Court did so136 by 
analyzing HIV infection under regulations defining "impairment" is­
sued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
under the Rehabilitation Act.137 Measuring Abbott's condition against 
those regulations, the Court had little difficulty concluding that HIV 
infection is an impairment. The Court went on to agree with Abbott's 
130. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995). 
132. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629. 
133. Id. at 639-42. 
134. Id. at 641. 
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). 
136. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632-33. 
137. Those regulations define an impairment as: 
{A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss af­
fecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special 
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, 
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological 
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, 
and specific learning disabilities. 
45 C.F.R. § 84.3G)(2)(i) (1997). HEW's regulations were adopted verbatim by the Justice 
Department when enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was transferred to 
the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 41.3l(b)(l) (1997). 
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contention that reproduction is a major. life activity, 138 again looking to 
Rehabilitation Act regulations in determining what constitutes a 
"major life activity."139 
In deciding whether asymptomatic HIV infection substantially lim­
its the major life activity of reproduction, however, the Court noted 
that the "Rehabilitation Act regulations provide no additional guid­
ance. "140 The Court then proceeded to analyze that question inde­
pendently. The Court concluded that Abbott's HIV status did substan­
tially limit her ability to reproduce, even though reproduction was 
admittedly not physically hampered by the virus.141 Accordingly, be­
cause Abbott had a physical impairment that substantially limited her 
major life activity of reproduction, the Court held that she was an in­
dividual with a disability.142 
Although the Court readily deferred to HEW's regulations in de­
ciding that Abbott had an impairment and that reproduction was a 
major life activity, the Court was not willing to accept as controlling 
other agency determinations, issued under both the Rehabilitation Act 
and under the ADA, that persons with asymptomatic HIV were indi­
viduals with a disability.143 The Court acknowledged as a "comprehen­
sive and significant administrative precedent"144 an opinion by the Of­
fice of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, which concluded 
that HIV-infected persons were protected by Section 504 of the Reha­
bilitation Act.145 Yet the Court used the opinion as merely persuasive 
authority for the Court's own conclusion regarding disability status. 
The OLC's views served only to "confirm" the Court's finding, not to 
138. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-39. The Court noted that other major life activities 
also may have been substantially limited by Abbott's infection. However, it limited its in­
quiry to reproduction because that was the ground on which the case had been decided be­
low and on which certiorari had been granted. Id. at 638. 
139. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997). As the Court explained: 
These regulations are contrary to petitioner's attempt to limit the meaning of the term "ma­
jor" to public activities. The inclusion of activities such as caring for one's self and perform­
ing manual tasks belies the suggestion that a task must have a public or economic character 
in order to be a major life activity for purposes of the ADA. On the contrary, the Rehabilita­
tion Act regulations support the inclusion of reproduction as a major life activity, since re­
production could not be regarded as any less important than working and learning. 
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
140. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 
141. Id. at 639-47. 
142. The Court, however, did not hold that asymptomatic HIV infection is a per se dis­
ability, finding it unnecessary to reach that question. Rather, the Court noted that Abbott's 
HIV infection influenced her decision not to bear a child, thereby substantially limiting her 
in the major life activity of reproduction. Id. at 641-42. 
143. See id. at 642-44 (citing agency views). 
144. Id. at 642. 
145. Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 
12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209, 210 (1988). 
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control it.146 Although noting that "[e]very agency to consider the issue 
under the Rehabilitation Act found statutory coverage for persons 
with asymptomatic HIV,"147 the Court declared, 
Responsibility for administering the Rehabilitation Act was not dele­
gated to a single agency, but we need not pause to inquire whether this 
causes us to withhold deference to agency interpretations under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). It is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the agen­
cies implementing a statute "constitute a body of experience and in­
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance. "148 
The Court thus appeared to acknowledge the agencies' views on the 
matter were deserving of some form of deference, but it was comfort­
able only with extending Skidmore deference absent further consid­
eration.149 
This distinction between deference to the Rehabilitation Act 
regulations and agency interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act pre­
sented in other formats makes sense when we remember that it is the 
ADA, not the Rehabilitation Act, the Court was construing in 
Bragdon v. Abbott. The Rehabilitation Act regulations were control­
ling on the Court only because Congress expressly stated the meaning 
of disability under the ADA was to be measured against those regula­
tions.150 Absent such a command, agency views of a prior statute 
would merely assist the Court in independently determining a subse­
quent statute's meaning under the well-established canon of con.struc­
tion that "[w)hen administrative and judicial interpretations have set­
tled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the 
same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the in­
tent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as 
well."151 
The Court, however, also considered the opinions of the Depart­
ment of Justice and the EEOC, two of the agencies responsible for in­
terpreting and implementing the ADA itself. Congress conferred on 
the Justice Department authority to implement the public accommo­
dations provisions of the ADA.152 The Justice Department's regula­
tions listed asymptomatic HIV as an "impairment,"153 and its Techni-
146. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). 
149. For a discussion of the distinction between Chevron and Skidmore deference, see 
supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; Colker, supra note 22, at 152. 
151. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978)). 
152. 42 u.s.c. § 12186(b) (1994). 
153. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1 )(iii) (1999). 
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cal Assistance Manual concludes that persons with asymptomatic HIV 
infection do fall within the statutory definition of "disability."154 Al­
though the Court noted those interpretations, it did not accord Chev­
ron deference to them.155 Moreover, the Court observed that its con­
clusion that Abbott was protected by the ADA was 
further reinforced by the administrative guidance issued by the Justice 
Department to implement the public accommodation provisions of Title 
III of the ADA. As the agency directed by Congress to issue imple­
menting regulations, to render technical assistance explaining the re­
sponsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, and to enforce Title 
III in court, the Department's views are entitled to deference.156 
The Court also stated it drew "guidance from the views of the 
agencies authorized to administer other sections of the ADA,"157 in­
cluding the EEOC's Interpretive Manual.158 The Court found these 
views "consistent with our holding that HIV infection, even in the so­
called asymptomatic phase, is an impairment which substantially limits 
the major life activity of reproduction."159 
Some viewed the Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott as a sign 
that the Court was prepared to give agencies the lead in establishing 
the ADA's reach.160 In fact, however, the opinion is equivocal. First, 
while the Court's interpretations of Title III of the ADA tracked 
HEW's regulations, the Court was not willing to say that reasonable 
agency interpretations of those regulations were entitled to Chevron 
deference.161 Second, although the Court cited Chevron after remark­
ing that the Justice Department's views of Title III were entitled to 
deference, the Court did not appear to engage in a Chevron analysis. 
Instead, it independently interpreted the statute and the HEW regula-
154. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT: TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 9 (1993). 
155. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646. 
156. Id. (citations omitted). 
157. Id. at 647. 
158. "Most categorical of all is EEOC's conclusion that 'an individual who has HIV in­
fection (including asymptomatic HIV infection) is an individual with a disability.' In the 
EEOC's view, 'impairments . . .  such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limit­
ing.' " Id. (quoting EEOC Interpretive Manual § 902.4(c)(l), p. 902-21; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
app., at 350 (1997) ). 
159. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 647. 
160. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 94-95 (explaining how Bragdon pointed to­
ward deference); Colker, supra note 22, at 152; Greaney, supra note 22, at 1288-89. As Pro­
fessor Colker asserts, "[Bragdon] explicitly held that the current ADA regulations 'are enti­
tled to deference' under Chevron." Colker, supra note 22, at 152. The EEOC and the Justice 
Department shared this view. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19, Murphy v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (No. 97-1992) (Bragdon accorded "Chevron 
deference to, inter alia, administrative guidance interpreting the ADA"). 
161. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642. 
December 2000] Deference and Disability Discrimination 559 
tions, using the Justice Department's views to "reinforce" its posi­
tion. 162 Had a Chevron analysis been employed, the Court would have 
asked whether the statute spoke directly to the precise question at is­
sue, and if not, would have asked whether the Justice Department's 
view was deserving of deference under Chevron's Step Two.163 
The following Term, the Court created even more uncertainty over 
what form of deference, if any, applies to agency interpretations of the 
ADA. This time, the statute at issue was not Title III of the ADA, but 
Title I, and the agency at issue was not the Justice Department, but 
the EEOC. 
D.  Sutton v .  United Air Lines and the "Mitigating Measures" Puzzle: 
No Deference Extended 
In 1999, the Court again confronted the meaning of "disability" 
under the ADA. Three cases confronted a common issue: in deter­
mining whether an impairment substantially limits major life activities, 
should the court take into account mitigating measures, such as medi­
cation or auxiliary aids.164 Of the three cases, Sutton v. United Air 
Lines165 is the most important because it served as the Court's primary 
vehicle for exploring this issue.166 
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were twin sisters who sought 
employment as commercial airline pilots with United Air Lines. Each 
suffered from severe myopia of, at best, 20/200 uncorrected vision. 
Without eyeglasses they were legally blind. With glasses, however, 
they had, at worst, 20/20 vision.167 United rejected their applications 
because neither twin could meet United's requirement that its pilots 
162. Id.; see also Duffy, supra note 18, at 210 n.497. 
163. As Professor Duffy correctly notes, the Court quoted and cited Chevron, 
Yet the structure of the Court's analysis was entirely inconsistent with the framework estab­
lished in Chevron: Rather than first deciding whether the statute was ambiguous and, if it 
was, then deferring to reasonable agency regulations, the Court interpreted the statute on its 
own, holding that "HIV infection [is] a disability under . . .  the definitional section of the 
statute." The Department of Justice's regulations were consulted only to "reinforce" the 
Court's own conclusion on the statute's proper interpretation. 
Duffy, supra note 18, at 210 n.497 (citations omitted). 
164. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 535 (1999). 
165. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
166. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518 ("In light of our decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, 
Inc. , we conclude that the Court of Appeals' resolution of both issues was correct.") (citation 
omitted); Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565 ("We have just held, however, in Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc. , that mitigating measures must be taken into account in judging whether an 
individual possesses a disability.") (citation omitted). 
167. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
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have 20/100 uncorrected vision.168 The sisters sued, claiming United's 
failure to hire them violated the ADA. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the two 
women were not within the ADA's protected class.169 It did so after 
first concluding that the EEOC's view "that persons are to be evalu­
ated in their hypothetical uncorrected state - is an impermissible in­
terpretation of the ADA."170 
The Court reached this result based on a textualist reading of the 
ADA as a whole,171 a reading made without consideration of extensive 
legislative history strongly supporting the EEOC's position.172 The 
Court instead looked to three provisions of the ADA. It first focused 
on the phrase "substantially limits,"173 a phrase in the "present indica­
tive verb form."174 That verb form, said the Court, requires that a per­
son be "presently . . .  substantially limited."175 "To be sure," said the 
Court, "a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by 
mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is 
corrected it does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity."176 
168. Id. at 476. 
169. Id. at 477. 
170. Id. at 482. 
171. "Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a person is taking measures to 
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures -
both positive and negative - must be taken into account when judging whether that person 
is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act." Id. 
172. "Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read [to preclude con­
sideration of mitigating measures] we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative his­
tory." Id. The legislative history weighing against the Court's position, however, was consid­
erable. The Senate Report on the bill asserts that "whether a person has a disability should 
be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable ac­
commodations or auxiliary aids." S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989). House Committees ex­
pressed similar understandings. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states, 
"The impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such 
as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limi­
tation." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990). The Report of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor provides that "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed 
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommoda­
tions or auxiliary aids." H.R. REP. No. 101-141, pt. 2, at 52 (1990). Justice Stevens' dissenting 
opinion quoted and relied upon these materials. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-501. 
173. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. Recall that the ADA defines a disability primarily as "a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . .  major life activities." 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). That the sisters had an impairment was not questioned by 
the Court or the parties. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. Rather, the question was whether that im­
pairment substantially limited any major life activity. 
174. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 ("Because the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in the 
Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring 
that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited in or­
der to demonstrate a disability."). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 483. 
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Second, the Court said statutory references to an "individual" re­
quired an individualized inquiry on disability status.177 The EEOC's 
approach "runs directly counter to the individualized inquiry man­
dated by the ADA,"178 as it would assess how people generally would 
be affected by an uncorrected impairment, a hypothetical inquiry at 
odds with the statute's focus on the impairment's actual effect on the 
individual in question.179 
"[F]inally and critically," the Court looked to the findings enacted 
as part of the ADA, that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or 
more physical or mental disabilities."180 The Court found this number, 
the source of which admittedly was unclear, dispositive.181 
Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical 
limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have 
cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings. That it 
did not is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those 
whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.182 
Because the sisters, when wearing corrective lenses, could see per­
fectly, their impairment did not substantially limit any major life ac­
tivity. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 483-84. 
179. The Court used the example of diabetes to illustrate what it viewed as a flaw in the 
guidelines. Under the EEOC's view, 
courts would almost certainly find all diabetics to be disabled, because if they failed to moni­
tor their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they would almost certainly be substan­
tially limited in one or more major life activities. A diabetic whose illness does not impair his 
or her daily activities would therefore be considered disabled simply because he or she has 
diabetes. 
Id. at 483. Ironically, the Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor cited 
persons with diabetes as those who would be covered by the disability definition, even if the 
effects of their disease were controlled by their medication. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 
52 (1990). See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500-501 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
180. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994)). 
181. Id. That the "exact source of the 43 million figure is not clear," as the Court con­
fessed, is an understatement. No source identified by the Court corresponded to the 43 mil­
lion figure. Without any support from the text or legislative history, however, the Court sup­
posed that a 1988 report from the National Council on Disability - which was entitled "On 
the Threshold of Independence" and which identified 37.3 million people suffering from 
functional limitations when using mitigating measures - was significant to Congress's use of 
the figure of 43 million. The Court supposed that the 43 million "probably can be explained" 
by Congress's attempt to adjust the National Council's figure to include institutionalized 
persons excluded from its report. The Court also noted that reports on persons with "a 
health condition" cited substantially greater numbers. Id. at 485-86. 
182. Id. at 487. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on the 43 mil­
lion figure. As she noted, "the inclusion of correctable disabilities within the AD A's domain 
would extend the Act's coverage to far more than 43 million people." Id. at 494. Moreover, 
the findings described individuals with a disability as a "discrete and insular minority," which 
she viewed as inconsistent with coverage of "the large numbers of diverse individuals with 
corrected disabilities." Id. 
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The Court also rejected the twins' argument that United regarded 
their impairment as substantially limiting the major life activity of 
working.183 EEOC regulations list "working" as a major life activity,184 
and the parties accepted that view.185 Importantly, however, the Sutton 
Court not only questioned the EEOC's authority to promulgate the 
regulation but hinted strongly that it may not be prepared to view 
"working" as a major life activity,186 thereby raising additional ques­
tions about the validity of the EEOC's regulations. The Court found it 
unnecessary to resolve this issue, however, as the regulations further 
provide that an individual is substantially limited in the major life ac­
tivity of working only if the impairment restricts the individual from 
performing work in a broad class or range of jobs.187 Because United 
regarded the sisters as unable to perform only the job of global airline 
pilot, it did not regard them as unable to perform work in a broad class 
of jobs.188 Thus, because their impairment, in its mitigated state, nei­
ther substantially limited their ability to perform any major life activ­
ity, nor did their employer regard them as having any such impair­
ment, Kimberly Sutton and Karen Hinton had no claim under the 
ADA.189 
183. Id. at 490. The Court stated: 
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: 
(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that sub­
stantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes 
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 
In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the indi­
vidual. . . .  " 
Id. at 489. The Court found that United did not regard the twins as substantially limited. Id. 
at 490-91. 
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) (1999). 
185. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 ("Because the parties accept that the term 'major life activi­
ties' includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations."). 
186. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Arg. at 15, School Board of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273 (1986) (No. 85-1277)). This reservation on the Court's part appears inconsistent 
with Congress's stipulation that the ADA standards be no less protective than regulations 
adopted under the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). Those regulations in­
clude working as a major life activity. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 
84.3G)(2)(ii) (1999). 
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(t) (1999). 
188. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493
-
. As the Court explained: 
Even under the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, to which petitioners ask us to defer, "an in­
dividual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but 
who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier service, would not be sub­
stantially limited in the major life activity of working." 
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2). 
189. Having resolved the interpretive issue in Sutton, the Court then proceeded to apply 
that interpretation in the Murphy and Kirkingburg cases. Because Vaughn Murphy's high 
blood pressure, when medicated, did not substantially limit his ability to perform any major 
life activity, he had no d isability under prong one. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 
U.S. 516, 521 (1999). And because his employer did not regard him as unable to perform 
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IV. THE SUTTON COURT'S APPLICATION OF CHEVRON 
Sutton was a stunning defeat for the EEOC. The agency, backed 
by the Justice Department, had aggressively sought deference to its 
position on the mitigating measures issue.190 The EEOC, the inde­
pendent agency with primary responsibility for civil rights enforce­
ment, together with the Executive Branch, agreed on how best to re­
solve this difficult issue. Yet the Court summarily dismissed the 
EEOC's approach. 
According to the EEOC, the statute was silent or ambiguous on 
the question of whether "the inquiry into substantial limitation of a 
major life activity is to be undertaken with or without taking into ac­
count mitigating measures."191 Thus, citing Chevron, the EEOC con­
tended that the only question was whether its position was based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. And the agency insisted it was. 
Moreover, the EEOC asserted that deference was "especially appro­
priate here," given its "pivotal role 'in setting [the statutory] machin­
ery in motion.' "192 As the agency stated, "When agencies promulgate 
their regulations virtually contemporaneously with a statute's enact­
ment, utilizing the insights they derived from their participation in the 
legislative process, the rationale for granting deference is height­
ened.''193 And the EEOC insisted that, because its Interpretive Guid­
ance interpreted its own regulations, the Guidance was entitled to the 
strongest form of judicial deference.194 
Deference to the EEOC in Sutton would have given the agency the 
credibility and respect it has lacked for much of its existence. 195 And it 
mechanics' jobs generally, but only those that required driving a commercial motor vehicle, 
it did not regard him as having an impairment that substantially limited the major life activ­
ity of working, with the Court assuming arguendo the validity of the EEOC regulations. Id. 
at 522-23. In Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), the Court applied Sutton to 
ameliorative measures by which the body compensates for its own impairments, holding that 
those must be taken into account in determining whether a disability is present. Id. at 565-66. 
However, the Court found that even if Kirkingburg had a disability, he was not a qualified 
individual with a disability because he could not meet federal visual acuity standards. Id. at 
567-76. 
190. The EEOC has not always enjoyed the support of the Justice Department in its 
interpretation of the statutes it administers. See Devins, supra note 92, at 289-98. But in 
Sutton, the Justice Department agreed with the agency that the EEOC's interpretation was 
entitled to deference from the Court. 
191. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 
516 (1999) (No. 97-1992)No. 97-1992). The agency's amicus brief was invited by the Court. 
Id. at 1. 
192. Id. at 19 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)). 
193. Id. at 20. 
194. Id. at 18-19. 
195. See MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT 205 (1966) (describing the EEOC's weakness at its earliest stages). More re­
cently, the EEOC has been described as the Justice Department's "whipping boy" and as an 
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would have endorsed the independent agency's responsibility to de­
fine the parameters of the civil rights statute, as applied in the work­
place. When a statute is laden with ambiguity, as the ADA is,196 recog­
nizing the agency's leading role in its interpretation would have had 
significant consequences for development of employment discrimina­
tion policy and for the enforcement process.197 
But are the EEOC's interpretations of the ADA ever entitled to 
Chevron review? This question is perhaps the most provocative issue 
left unresolved in Sutton. Its resolution requires not only an analysis of 
the Sutton reasoning but exploration of the question the Sutton Court 
pointedly did not resolve: what deference, if any, is owed the EEOC's 
regulations and interpretive guidances issued under the ADA? 
It frankly is not clear whether the Sutton Court performed a Chev­
ron analysis. The decision could be read in one of three ways: (1) Be­
cause Congress did not give any agency authority to issue regulations 
implementing the term "disability," the Chevron doctrine was inappli­
cable, leaving the Court to perform an independent analysis of the 
statute;198 (2) assuming Chevron applies, the interpretive question may 
be resolved at Step One of Chevron, as the language of the statute it­
self answers the question being asked;199 or (3) assuming Chevron ap­
plies and the statutory meaning is uncertain, the agency's interpreta­
tion was rejected as an unreasonable reading of the statute.200 
On balance, the most defensible reading of the Sutton opinion is 
the second one, i.e. that the interpretive issue was resolved by the 
Court at Chevron's Step One. The Sutton Court was careful not to re­
solve the question of Chevron's applicability,201 thus making the first 
agency long viewed as "weak." Devins, supra note 92, at 289, 292. 
196. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 71 ("The statute bans disability discrimina­
tion in a broad, sweeping outline, but leaves the details to the EEOC and the courts."); 
Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 489-90 (1991). 
197. See White, supra note 2, at 57. As has been noted: 
In essence, Congress, in enacting the ADA, announced its opposition to disability discrimi­
nation, but provided only minimal guidance in describing the type of conduct to which it was 
opposed. The end result is a large delegation of authority to the EEOC and the courts, and a 
significant contributing factor to the current divergence of judicial opinion. 
Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 72. 
198. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) ("No agency, however, 
has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provi­
sions of the ADA. . . .  "). 
199. Id. at 482. ("Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that (mitigating measures] 
. . .  must be taken into account when judging whether [an individual] is 'substantially limited' 
in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act."). 
200. Id. ("We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach adopted by the 
agency . . .  is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA."). 
201. "Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these interpretive guidelines, 
we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due." Id. at 480. 
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reading problematic. Although the Court noted that no agency had 
been delegated authority to promulgate regulations implementing the 
ADA's general provisions, in which the definition of "disability" is lo­
cated, it did not hold Chevron inapplicable. Nor does the Court's 
opinion acknowledge ambiguity in the statute, making the third read­
ing a difficult one to support.202 Instead, the Court appears to assume 
that Chevron's analysis does apply and to find an answer to the miti­
gating measures puzzle in the words and structure of the statute itself, 
leaving for another day the question of what deference, if any, is due 
the EEOC when interpreting the ADA.203 
Sutton is a particularly dramatic example of a textualist approach 
to Step One of the Chevron two-step. None of the statutory provisions 
relied upon by the Court in finding congressional intent was disposi­
tive of the question presented.204 
First, the Sutton majority argued that the present indicative verb 
form of the ADA's criteria for "disability" implies that the statute 
covers only those who are "presently" disabled. But this argument 
begs the question whether mitigating measures are or are not to be 
considered in making the determination.205 In other words, were Ms. 
Sutton and Ms. Hinton "presently" disabled when their glasses were 
on or when their glasses were off? 
Second, an individualized assessment of the sisters' impairment 
and its effect on their major life activities required no hypothetical in­
quiry or generalization when assessing the impairment in either its 
mitigated or unmitigated state, as the Court assumed it would.206 The 
202. Id. at 481-89. 
203. The Court never directly states that it is employing a Chevron analysis. Instead, it 
examines the statute to determine whether Congress intended that an impairment be exam­
ined in its mitigated, as opposed to its unmitigated, state. Compare id. , with Food and Drug 
Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("Because this case 
involves an administrative agency's construction of a statute that it administers, our analysis 
is governed by Chevron.") (citation omitted). 
204. The circuit courts confronting this issue largely agreed, finding the statutory lan­
guage ambiguous. See supra note 15.  See also Crossley, supra note 127, at 625 (describing 
statutory definition of disability as "notoriously, albeit intentionally, vague and thus subject 
to varying interpretations"). 
205. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text; Samuel Issacharoff and Justin 
Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accom­
modate the Americans with Disabilities Act? 15 (Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) ("This exercise in grammatical reasoning is a stretch, to say the least."); 
Kamholz, supra note 22, at 103-04 (explaining that the statutory language has at least three 
different meanings). But see Harris, supra note 22, at 603 (asserting that "substantially lim­
its" precludes consideration in unmitigated state). 
206. As the Court stated: 
The agency approach would often require courts and employers to speculate about a per­
son's condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination 
based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects indi-
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record disclosed the twins' vision with glasses (virtually perfect) and 
without (legally blind); no hypothesizing was required.207 In fact, the 
twins were not hired by United because of their actual, not hypotheti­
cal, condition in its unmitigated state.208 Thus, to say that the statute 
requires a focus on the individual does little to advance resolution of 
the mitigating measures conundrum. 
Finally, the "43 million Americans" figure heavily relied upon by 
the Court proved only that Congress was remarkably imprecise if it 
was attempting to put a number on the individuals within the ADA's 
protected class.209 First, the Court could only speculate as to the report 
on which the figure was based. Second, that report itself described 
"the difficulty of estimating the number of disabled persons due to 
varying operational definitions of disability."210 No figure included in 
the report coincided with the 43 million figure cited by Congress.211 
Moreover, the Court cited no figures for the number of persons whose 
unmitigated impairments substantially limit their major life activities; 
it cited figures only for the number of persons with impairments. In 
short, rather than being a critical clue to statutory meaning, the "find­
ings" did little to clarify congressional intent on the matter.212 That the 
Court used them to supply a "plain meaning" to the statute was stun­
ning. 
The Court's construction of the statute has the perverse effect of 
eliminating relief against discrimination for those who have mitigated 
disabilities. Under Sutton, employers will be free to discriminate 
against individuals who have fully correctable physical or mental im­
pairments, even when the employer is discriminating because of the 
impairments' effects in their unmitigated state. 213 This result seems at 
victuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition. 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. But see Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 205, at 16 ("[T]he Court's 
conclusion that an examination of the unmitigated condition would preclude an individual­
specific inquiry ignores the actual, individualized evidence in the case before it."). 
207. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
208. Id. 
209. The majority describes this number as "critical[]" to its interpretation. Id. at 484. 
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence regards it as one of the "strongest clues" to Congressional 
intent. Id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
210. Id. at 485. 
211. Id. at 485-86. 
212. This aspect of Sutton has been described as "a peculiar connect-the-dots approach 
to statutory interpretation." Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 205, at 17. As stated by Gary 
E. Phelan, one attorney interviewed about the decision, "I've never seen a court place such 
emphasis on language in a preamble. I think its more an indication that [the Supreme Court 
majority] knew the answer they wanted to reach and had to find some rationale and that was 
one way to get there." Susan J. McGolrick, Supreme Court's Three ADA Decisions Disap­
point Disability Rights Advocates, 68 U.S. LAW WEEK 2035, 2037 (July 20, 1999). 
213. This point was brought forcefully home in Justice Stevens' dissent. As he stated: 
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odds with congressional intent to bring such persons into the economic 
mainstream. 214 
Importantly, if the statute is to be considered as a whole in deter­
mining its meaning, as the Court insisted it must,215 then the scope of 
Title I of the ADA, the title under which the twin sisters sought the 
Act's protections, should have been considered. Recall that the em­
. ployment Title of the ADA extends its protections only to a qualified 
individual with a disability, one who can perform essential job func­
tions.216 Often, it is the mitigating measure that enables the individual 
to perform her job. Sutton and Hinton were not contending they were 
able to fly airplanes in their unmitigated state; they understood that 
whatever the reach of the ADA, it did not encompass putting blind 
pilots into the cockpits of commercial airliners. Rather, their claim was 
that because their eyeglasses enabled them to see, they were qualified 
to fly the plane, despite their myopia. Whether they were correct or 
incorrect in this assumption would seem a question best suited for an 
analysis of whether they were or were not qualified individuals with a 
disability.217 Resolving the case at the disability threshold preempted 
this inquiry. 
The seven-justice majority opinion in Sutton reflects a triumph of a 
textualist methodology of statutory interpretation.218 If the operative 
language of the ADA possesses the requisite clarity vis-a-vis the miti­
gating measures issue, then it is difficult to imagine a statute not sus­
ceptible to resolution at Chevron's Step One under a textualist read­
ing.219 
The Court's refusal to consider the statute's legislative history 
when exploring the statute's meaning220 raises troubling questions 
about the consequences of applying a textualist approach at Step One 
of Chevron analysis. 221 In the case of Sutton, extensive legislative his-
The Court's misdirected approach permits any employer to dismiss out of hand every person 
who has uncorrected eyesight worse than 20/100 without regard to the specific qualifications 
of those individuals or the extent of their abilities to overcome their impairment. Jn much 
the same way, the Court's approach would seem to allow an employer to refuse to hire every 
person who has epilepsy or diabetes that is controlled by medication, or every person who 
functions efficiently with a prosthetic limb. 
Sutton, 527 U.S. 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
214. See sources cited supra note 172. 
215. Id. at 482. 
216. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
217. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 510-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
218. See Tepker, supra note 33, at 184. 
219. But see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (upholding some of 
FCC's challenged regulations at Step Two of Chevron). 
220. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
221. While reasonable people may disagree about how the statutory definition should 
best be interpreted, to find that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue 
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tory did, in fact, speak directly to the question at issue in the case.222 
As noted by Justice Stevens' dissent, multiple committee reports from 
both the House and Senate were "replete with references to the un­
derstanding that the Act's protected class includes individuals with 
various medical conditions that ordinarily are perfectly 'correctable' 
with medication or treatment."223 Even if the Sutton majority is correct 
that a textualist reading of the ADA can reveal a clear congressional 
intent, the legislative history set forth in Sutton, together with the in­
determinate statutory language, should have been sufficient to prevent 
the Court from rejecting the agency's view at Chevron's Step One.224 
To be sure, disagreements within the Court long have simmered 
over the appropriate role of legislative history in determining statutory 
meaning.225 Yet the Sutton majority's refusal to address such relevant 
evidence of congressional intent reveals the extent to which a textual­
ist methodology, which purports to be ideologically neutral, can both 
conceal and justify a great deal of judicial activism at Step One of 
Chevron analysis. 
The Court has been increasingly willing to resolve interpretive 
questions at Chevron's Step One for years, thereby avoiding any need 
to defer to an agency's statutory interpretations.226 Sutton could be 
read as suggesting that an increasingly conservative Court is no longer 
through its statutory language strains credulity. See Eichhorn, supra note 33, at 1108 ("First, 
and most importantly, the holding imposes a 'plain meaning' analysis upon statutory lan­
guage that is far from plain."); Tepker, supra note 33, at 197 (criticizing the Sutton analysis as 
inconsistent with "the judicial virtue of fidelity to the text. This approach is exactly the kind 
of policy-laden presumption that the defenders of judicial restraint say they oppose."). But 
see Harris, supra note 22, at 603, who maintains that the ADA's language is not ambiguous 
on mitigating measures issue since the statute is written in the present tense. Harris also con­
tends, however, that "it is not clear whether individuals with controlled impairments should 
benefit from the Act's protections," id. at 594, and that even if the Act's language were am­
biguous, the EEOC guidelines are nevertheless inconsistent with some of the Act's "plain 
language." Id. at 603. These contradictory contentions are puzzling. For a similar viewpoint, 
see Bridges, supra note 16, at 1073 (advocating resolution of mitigating measures issue at 
Step One of Chevron analysis); Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the 
ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 145 (1998) (use of present tense in "substantially limits" unambi­
guously requires consideration of mitigating measures). 
222. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. As noted by the EEOC and the United 
States, "That expression of Congress's understanding, repeated in the three relevant com­
mittee reports on the ADA, is unusually clear and unequivocal, and it makes Congress's in­
tent unmistakable." Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (No. 97-1992). 
223. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
224. In his Sutton dissent, Justice Stevens used legislative history to resolve the interpre­
tive issue at Step One in a manner consistent with the agency's reading of the statute. See 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-503. 
225. See Mank, supra note 21, at 532-33; Pierce, supra note 4, at 777; Tepker, supra note 
33, at 184 n.19. 
226. See Mank, supra note 21; Pierce, supra note 4. 
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willing to defer to what it perceives as more liberal agency agendas.227 
The Court has not disavowed Chevron, however, and it subsequently 
has applied a straightforward Chevron analysis, albeit one that re­
solves the interpretive question at Chevron's Step One, in confronting 
an agency's construction of the statute it administers.228 
Was there, then, something about the statute in question that made 
the Court's refusal to defer to the EEOC in Sutton consistent with a 
continuing commitment to a robust Chevron doctrine? A full critique 
of the decision in Sutton requires exploration of this latter point. 
V. THE POLITICS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
IMPACT ON CHEVRON 
Perhaps the Court believes that there is something about the stat­
utes administered by the EEOC that makes Chevron deference to the 
agency somehow inappropriate. After all, the Supreme Court did 
more than simply fail to defer to the EEOC's interpretation in Sutton. 
It suggested that the EEOC's regulations concerning what constitutes 
a disability may be entitled to no deference at all229 and pointedly 
questioned the agency's regulatory conclusion that working is a major 
life activity, even though that regulatory approach is a well-accepted 
component of disability law.230 
Why might the Court think that the EEOC is not entitled to 
meaningful deference? Perhaps it is the importance of Title VII, the 
ADEA and the ADA for citizens' liberty and autonomy that makes 
deference to an administrative agency on such issues unacceptable.231 
227. One commentator has suggested the decision is best explained by an interpretive 
approach that defers to employer discretion. See Tepker, supra note 33, at 197. More 
broadly, perhaps the decision reflects shifts in political winds since Chevron was decided. A 
conservative judiciary may be unwilling to support the views of a Democratic administration. 
Pierce, supra note 4, at 780. 
228. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
133-43 (2000) (looking at statute as a whole, together with legislative history, in finding that 
Congress intended to preclude the FDA's regulation of tobacco). 
229. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480. The Sutton Court's approach to the EEOC's regulations on 
the definition of disability may be contrasted with the Bragdon Court's approach to the Jus­
tice Department's regulations on disability. While the Court declined to decide whether the 
Justice Department's regulations would receive Chevron deference, it found they at the least 
were entitled to deference under Skidmore. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; Be­
fort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 94-97 (contrasting the Bragdon Court's deferential approach 
with that exhibited in Sutton); Eichhorn, supra note 33, at 1110 (noting this aspect of Sutton 
"indeed reinforces the idea that the EEOC is wrongly receiving second-class treatment at 
the hands of the courts"). 
230. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3U)(2)(ii) (1999); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1999). This reservation 
was noted by the Sutton Court, despite the ADA's directive that ADA standards be no less 
protective than regulations adopted under the Rehabilitation Act. See supra notes 99-100 
and accompanying text. 
231. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 73-74 (suggesting that the policy choices un­
derlying the ADA may tempt some judges to exercise their own discretion rather than defer 
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A Administrative Agencies, Civil Rights, and Chevron 
The issue of discrimination, particularly race discrimination, is the 
most intractable problem confronting American society. How that is­
sue is best confronted and resolved in the employment setting has con­
sequences for virtually every U.S. business, as well as for almost every 
U.S. employee. Although Congress, in passing Title VII, the ADEA, 
and the ADA, has made basic and important policy choices in out­
lawing employment discrimination, the ultimate reach of anti­
discrimination laws depends on how those laws are interpreted and 
applied.232 
If the Court means what it said in Chevron, however, the impor­
tance of the policy choices involved in the interpretation of a particu­
lar statute should support, not detract from, an agency's claim to def­
erence.233 After all, it was the need for important policy choices to be 
made by a politically accountable branch of government, rather than 
by politically unaccountable courts, that led the Chevron court to di­
vine a delegation of interpretive authority from statutory silence or 
ambiguity.234 If so, the importance of the policy choices involved in the 
interpretation of Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA should have re­
sulted in more, not less, deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the 
statutes it administers and enforces. 
The Court's experience with the EEOC, however, has centered 
primarily around Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.235 The theoretical 
underpinnings of Chevron notwithstanding, the Supreme Court simply 
may be unwilling to permit an administrative agency to roam within a 
to the agency). 
232. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 710, 729 
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). 
233. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984): 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices 
- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re­
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of 
the statute in light of everyday realities. 
Id. at 865-66. 
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is 
authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial 
branches . . . .  As Chevron itself illustrates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is 
often more a question of policy than of law. 
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mjnes, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991). 
234. See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 696; Diver, supra note 18, at 593-95; Daniel A. Farber, Leg­
islative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV: 667, 678 (1991); Kmiec, supra note 4, 
at 277; Manning, supra note 41, at 625; Merrill, supra note 4, at 993-1003; Scalia, supra note 
4, at 515; Starr, supra note 4, at 309, 312. 
235. See White, supra note 2, at 71-76 (describing the Court's deference to the EEOC 
under Title VII). 
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wide range of "reasonable" action in determining the parameters of 
antidiscrimination law. After all, Chevron requires a reviewing court 
to uphold an agency interpretation the court itself believes is second­
best, so long as that interpretation is reasonable.236 In the sensitive 
area of race or sex discrimination, the Supreme Court may be unwill­
ing to defer to an agency interpretation with which it disagrees. Per­
haps the Court senses that Title VII has needed the imprimatur of the 
courts behind it for the statute's basic mandates to be accepted.237 
Essentially, despite its failure to say it in so many words, perhaps 
the Court believes the deference principles· of Chevron are inapplica­
ble to a statute, such as Title VII, whose interpretation intimately af­
fects the civil rights of virtually every working man and woman.238 
Whether Title VII embraces the concept of disparate impact,239 
whether, and under what circumstances, an employer may engage in 
affirmative action,240 and whether the prohibitions of Title VII encom­
pass discrimination on the basis of pregnancy241 or sexual harassment242 
are fundamentally more important to defining the scope of individual 
rights than is the definition of a "stationary source" under the Clean 
Air Act.243 In short, perhaps there is an outer limit to Chevron's ap­
proach to political accountability. If so, the Supreme Court may be­
lieve Title VII lies outside it. 
Congress's failure to confer substantive rulemaking authority on 
the EEOC under Title VII could be understood as endorsing this 
view. Although this interpretation is inconsistent with a strong reading 
of Chevron, i.e., one that would not find Chevron review dependent 
upon a delegation of rulemaking authority,244 it is a possible explana-
236. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
237. James A. Goldston, Race Discrimination in Europe: Problems and Prospects, 5 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 462 (1999): 
Under certain circumstances, judicial decisions may have more moral authority than purely 
political decisions, precisely because - however true it is - the law is seen by many to rest 
on more neutral considerations of justice and right than the crass or petty concerns which 
motivate hand-slapping politicking in smoke-filled rooms. 
Id. at 464. 
238. See Wern, supra note 3, at 1579 (asserting that perhaps the Court wants Congress 
to make "these sensitive policy decisions" and thus refuses to defer to the EEOC despite 
statutory ambiguity). It may be true, but it is beside the point. If a statute is ambiguous, its 
interpretation involves policymaking that will be accomplished not by Congress but by the 
Court, if deference to the agency does not occur. 
239. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
240. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
241. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
242. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
243. Chevron involved review of the EPA's interpretation of the term "source" in the 
Clean Air Act. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 
(1984). 
244. In a previous article, I have explained why the EEOC's lack of substantive rule-
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tion for the Court's unwillingness to give meaningful deference to the 
EEOC under Title VII. 
But what of the ADEA or the ADA? Congress did confer substan­
tive rulemaking authority under those statutes, reflecting a clear con­
gressional intent to have the agency fill in the statutory gaps.245 Why 
might Congress have been willing to give an administrative agency a 
leading role under those statutes, if it was unwilling to do so under Ti­
tle VII? 
Unlike race and gender classifications, age and disability classifica­
tions are not immutable. All of us, should we be lucky to live long 
enough, will ultimately fall within the ADEA's protected class. And 
each of us who is not already a member is potentially a member of the 
ADA's protected class. The potential applicability of age or disability 
classifications to every citizen suggests that such interests may be rela­
tively more likely to receive protection through the political process. 246 
Congress may have been willing, as exemplified by its decision to con­
fer substantive rulemaking authority on the EEOC, to have a politi­
cally accountable agency resolve interpretive questions arising under 
the ADA. 
In addition, the issues raised by the ADA in particular are of the 
sort that often demand a technical expertise not required by Title 
VIl.247 Deciding how jobs should be restructured or buildings recon­
figured is a daunting task, as evidenced by the volumes of materials, 
including technical assistance manuals, produced by the agencies 
charged with carrying out the statute's mandates.248 To the extent that 
making authority under Title VII should not be viewed as foreclosing the agency's claim to 
Chevron review of its interpretations of that statute. White, supra note 2, at 92-102. I argued 
that the agency's enforcement power supported an implicit delegation of interpretive 
authority, even though the power to issue new obligations through legislative rules had been 
withheld. Id. However, as I conceded, finding Chevron applicable to the EEOC's interpreta­
tions of Title VII is more difficult than applying Chevron to the agency's interpretations of 
the ADEA and the ADA. Id. at 92. 
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). 
246. But see infra notes 253-254 and accompanying text. 
247. Cf Wern, supra note 3, at 1579, who suggests the lack of technical complexity of 
the statutes administered by the EEOC may explain the lack of deference extended to the 
agency by the courts. As he states, 
The EEOC's domain, employment discrimination, is not an arena that requires such techni­
cal expertise; rather, logic and basic fairness concerns may dominate decisionmaking in this 
area. Simply put, judges believe that they do not need an agency telling them who has or has 
not suffered wrongful discrimination; yet they welcome agency guidance in technical areas 
where judicial reasoning is not sufficient. 
Id; see also Befort & Thomas, supra note 9, at 68, 73-74. 
248. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1999); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1999); 49 
C.F.R. pt. 37 (1999); EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT 
PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992); U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL (1993); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH D ISABILITIES ACT: TITLE 
III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL (1993). 
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agency expertise is a premise of the Chevron doctrine,249 the ADA is a 
prime candidate for application of Chevron review principles. 
And yet the Court has been reluctant to agree. Perhaps the expla­
nation lies in the Court's unwillingness to surrender Fourteenth 
Amendment turf to another branch of government. 
In enacting the ADA, Congress expressly relied upon its powers 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when extending the 
ADA to the states.25° Congress, moreover, described individuals with 
disabilities as a "discrete and insular minority,"251 a description Justice 
Ginsburg noted in her Sutton concurrence.252 The Court since has held 
that Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of congressional 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.253 
Although the Court extends Congress "much deference" in deter­
mining whether legislation is needed to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, " [t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province 
of the Judicial Branch."254 The Court is not about to allow Congress to 
supply substantive meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment by deter­
mining which groups are, or are not, "discrete and insular mi­
norit[ies]" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes;255 and if Congress it-
249. Chevron review is justified, in part, "because of the agency's greater familiarity 
with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated." Food 
and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). See also 
Saunders, supra note 82, at 362 (questions that are technical in nature or that call for agency 
expertise suggest an implicit delegation of interpretive authority). But see Duffy, supra note 
18, at 203 (describing agency expertise and political accountability as "mere window dress­
ing" for Chevron deference); Scalia, supra note 4, at 514 ("[Agency expertise means that the 
agency is] more likely than the courts to reach the correct result. That [argument] is, if true, 
a good practical reason for accepting the agency's views, but hardly a valid theoretical justi­
fication for doing so."). 
250. 42 u.s.c. § 12101(b)(4) (1994). 
251. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). 
252. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concur­
ring). 
253. University of Alabama at Birmingham v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001). The Four­
teenth Amendment issue arises in the wake of the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), in which the Court held that Congress may waive a 
nonconsenting state's immunity from citizen suits only when enacting legislation pursuant to 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since Congress expressed an unequivocal intent to 
abrogate states' immunity from suit under the ADA, the question becomes whether the 
ADA was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the 
answer is no, the substantive commands of the statute vis-a-vis the states still stand; en­
forcement of the ADA against nonconsenting states through private litigation, however, 
would be foreclosed. 
254. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
255. See Robert C. Post & Riva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis­
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441 (2000) (criticizing 
Court for holding Congress to a litigation model in enacting legislation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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self lacks that interpretive power, then Congress cannot delegate that 
power to an administrative agency. Perhaps the Sutton Court's un­
willingness to allow the EEOC to flesh out the meaning of "disability" 
reflects a concern with perceived congressional overreaching into the 
Court's constitutional turf. 
But such concerns, if they were driving the Sutton Court, were 
misplaced. Congress has the clear power under the Commerce Clause 
to enact the ADA and to apply it to the private and public sector 
workplace.256 And the agency's responsibility is to interpret the statute 
that Congress constitutionally enacted. That statute, as interpreted by 
the agency, in fact may exceed Congress's Fourteenth Amendment 
powers as applied to the states. Statutory commands may and often do 
exceed constitutional prohibitions. 
Yet it remains the Court's role to determine whether the statute 
exceeds congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
thereby leaving the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity intact. 
That the agency supplies meaning to the statute in no way interferes 
with the Court's authority to determine whether the statute, as written 
by Congress and interpreted by the agency, goes beyond Congress's 
Fourteenth Amendment powers. Chevron review of agency interpre­
tation of statutes enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
encroach on the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution. To 
view the Fourteenth Amendment parallel as a basis for refusing to de­
fer to the EEOC's construction of the statute it administers is to de­
prive the politically accountable branches of government the power to 
determine the substantive reach of statutory, not constitutional, com­
mands. 
In summary, the EEOC, particularly (although not exclusively) in 
the context of the ADA, is an agency deserving of Chevron review 
when interpreting the statute. It "makes sense" in the context of the 
ADA to believe Congress preferred that interpretive issues left unre­
solved by the statute be untangled by an expert agency sensitive to the 
technical complexities of the statutory scheme and better able to re­
solve policy choices inevitable in the implementation of a complex 
statute.257 Because a delegation of interpretive authority to the EEOC 
under Title I may readily be found, the EEOC's interpretations of Ti­
tle I's gaps and ambiguities generally are entitled to Chevron review. 
256. See id. at 78 (recognizing congressional power under the Commerce Clause to en­
act the ADEA and to extend it to the states). There is no reason to believe a different result 
would obtain under the ADA vis-a-vis Congress's Commerce Clause power. See Garrett, 121 
S. Ct. at 968 n.9 (2001). 
257. See Breyer, supra note 61, at 370 (Chevron deference is appropriate when a statu­
tory scheme suggests that Congress intended that agencies, not courts, resolve statutory am­
biguities). 
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B. Chevron's Step One: A Kind of Nondelegation Doctrine? 
575 
To say, however, that the EEOC generally is deserving of Chevron 
deference when interpreting statutory ambiguities in the ADA does 
not mean that the Court necessarily should have deferred to the 
EEOC in Sutton. Application of Chevron instead demands a careful 
look at the particular interpretive issue posed. 
In its most recent application of Chevron, the Supreme Court sug­
gested that the importance of the question posed may "in extraordi­
nary cases" influence the Court's application of Chevron.258 As the 
Court stated, 
[O]ur inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue is shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the 
question presented. Deference under Chevron to an agency's construc­
tion of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a stat­
ute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there 
may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended 
such an implicit delegation.259 
Even though Congress may generally have delegated interpretive 
authority to an agency, and a Chevron review standard is appropri­
ately applied, the significance of the policy choice represented by a 
particular interpretive question may shape the Court's application of 
Chevron's Step One. 
In Brown & Williamson, for example, the Court was confronted 
with the FD A's contention that tobacco was a "drug" and that tobacco 
products were thus subject to regulation by the agency.260 Acknowl­
edging that Congress delegated to the FDA the authority to interpret 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and that a Chevron analysis there­
fore was applicable,261 the Court went on to reject the agency's con­
struction at Step One of Chevron.262 In doing so, the Court openly re­
lied upon the importance of the policy question presented. In finding 
that Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue and 
, had precluded the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, the 
Court tellingly observed, "we are confident that Congress could not 
have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political 
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion. "263 
258. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 159 
(2000). 
259. Id. (citation omitted). 
260. Id. at 131. 
261. Id at 132. The Court's application of Chevron analysis to this question would seem 
to silence those who contend that Chevron is inapplicable to jurisdictional questions. 
262. Id. at 133. 
263. Id. at 160. This approach makes sense when one recalls that Chevron is best under­
stood as a reconstruction of congressional intent. If the Court does not believe Congress in-
576 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:532 
Is this acknowledgment that some important policy questions must 
be legislatively resolved the best explanation for the Sutton holding? 
Finding "clear" congressional meaning when particularly significant 
policy questions are presented allows the Court to avoid reinvigorat­
ing the nondelegation doctrine, something the Court has been loathe 
to do.264 Were the Court to find a delegation of interpretive authority 
on questions of such economic and political significance, it would be 
forced to confront whether that delegation violates separation of pow­
ers concerns.265 Construing a statute so as to avoid a constitutional is­
sue is a longstanding tool of statutory construction, appropriately ap­
plied at Chevron's Step One.266 
But is the definition of disability such a question? Certainly, how 
broadly or narrowly one construes the statutory definition has consid­
erable implications for the statute's impact. Being an individual with a 
disability is a threshold coverage issue. Whether the statute, for exam­
ple, potentially protects 43 million, or over 160 million, persons267 has 
obvious significance for the statute's reach.268 
And yet even under the most expansive definition, the ADA's pro­
tections sweep no more broadly than other employment statutes under 
which interpretive authority has been delegated.269 Deciding the scope 
of protection under the Family and Medical Leave Act,270 or the extent 
tended to delegate interpretive authority, no deference to the agency should occur. See Sun­
stein, supra note 4, at 2085-2105. And when an issue is particularly important, it may be less 
likely that Congress chose not to resolve the issue itself. See Breyer, supra note 61, at 370. 
264. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 538 (1981). 
265. For discussions of Chevron's interplay with the nondelegation doctrinee, see 
Kmiec, supra note 4, and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political The­
ory in Administrative Law, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 469 (1985). In a separate article, Professor 
Pierce has suggested the Court's narrow interpretation of broad statutes may be a means of 
avoiding the nondelegation doctrine. Pierce, supra note 4, at 776. 
266. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 574-78 (1988) (construing statute governing handbilling at mall entrances so as 
not to conflict with First Amendment). See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2110-12. 
267. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1999). 
268. In a similar vein, it has been suggested that the uncertainty of employer obligations 
under the ADA, most notably the uncertainty of the contours of the duty of reasonable ac­
commodation, may have influenced the Sutton Court's narrow approach to the disability 
question. "The Court is straining the wording of all three prongs of the statute so much be­
cause the definition of disability is the ballgame." Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 205, at 
22. The authors assert that the Court uses the definition of disability as a filter to avoid im­
posing the "inherently ambiguous" duty of reasonable accommodation on employers. Id. 
269. Generally speaking, one must be an individual with a disability to receive protec­
tions under the ADA. Other employee protective statutes sweep far more broadly, covering 
most workers. 
270. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994); Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 763 (5th 
Cir. 1995) ("Administrative regulations promulgated in response to express delegations of 
authority, like the one at issue (in FMLA], 'are given controlling weight unless they are arbi­
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' " (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). 
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of the "white collar worker" exemptions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act,271 or who constitutes an employee under the National Labor Re­
lations Act,272 or establishing health and safety standards under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act,273 all involve significant policy 
questions for the employment community. 
That Congress was willing to allow agency interpretation to shape 
the disability definition is explicitly supported by the text of the ADA. 
Congress determined that the ADA should be no less protective than 
"the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to" the Rehabili­
tation Act.274 Although this provision admittedly is not an express 
delegation of interpretive authority to any particular agency under the 
ADA,275 the admonition is consistent with congressional willingness to 
allow administrative agencies to flesh out the details of an inherently 
ambiguous statutory definition. Determining the parameters of what 
constitutes a disability, Congress understood, is a topic well-suited to 
development through administrative expertise. 
Most important, the Court itself failed to invoke the "economic 
and political significance" of the ADA as an explanation for its ap­
proach at Step One of Sutton. The Court apparently did not view (and 
should not have viewed) the definition of disability as the extraordi­
nary case in which a delegation of interpretive authority should be 
suspect. Accordingly, further explanation for the failure to defer to the 
EEOC must be explored. 
VI. DEFERENCE AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: RETHINKING 
SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES 
As stated above, the magnitude of the interpretive issues presented 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act is an insufficient basis for not 
extending deference to agency interpretations of the statute. But that 
does not resolve whether the particular interpretive issue presented in 
Sutton was a legitimate candidate for Chevron deference. If the Court 
may be faulted for its textualist approach in Sutton, how should the 
Court have resolved the interpretive issue presented? 
271. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 
457 (1997) (applying Chevron analysis to Secretary of Labor's salary basis test). 
272. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994); Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat'I Labor Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 
392 (1996) (deferring to NLRB's interpretation of agricultural worker exemption). 
273. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 
U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding OSHA's cotton dust standard). 
274. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). 
275. Section 12201 is found in the Act's miscellaneous provisions. Nonetheless, an ar­
gument can be made that it should be viewed as a delegation of authority to the EEOC, the 
Justice Department, and the Secretary of Transportation to interpret not only the statute but 
the regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 
501 U.S. 680, 697-98 (1991). 
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A. The Definition of Disability: Was There a Delegation of 
Interpretive Authority to the EEOC? 
In order for Chevron review to apply, the Court must find an ex­
press or implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the agency. Ti­
tle I of the ADA confers on the EEOC the authority to promulgate 
.regulations to carry out that Title, a grant of authority commonly un­
derstood to support an express or implicit delegation of interpretive 
authority.276 The statutory definition of disability, however, is not 
found within Title I. Instead, that definition appears in the Act's gen­
eral definition section.277 
No agency has been expressly delegated authority to promulgate 
rules interpreting this section of the statute.278 Further complicating 
matters is the delegation of interpretive authority to multiple agencies 
under the ADA. While the EEOC has been delegated rulemaking 
authority under Title I of the statute,279 the Justice Department280 and 
the Department of Transportation281 have been delegated rulemaking 
authority under other Titles of the Act. The Act's general definition 
section, including its definition of an individual with a disability, ap­
plies to each of the Act's Titles.282 
In Bragdon v. Abbott and again in Sutton, the Court suggested that 
Congress's failure expressly to confer on any agency the authority to 
promulgate rules interpreting the Act's general definition section may 
mean no agency is deserving of deference when interpreting who is an 
individual with a disability.283 Thus, while the EEOC, for example, 
would be deserving of Chevron deference when interpreting ambigui­
ties or filling in statutory gaps in Title I, its extensive regulations 
fleshing out the meaning of an individual with a disability may be de­
serving of no deference whatsoever. Unless Congress delegated inter­
pretive authority to the agency, it is not entitled to deference under 
276. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
277. 42 u.s.c. § 1 2102(2) (1994). 
278. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) ("Most notably, no 
agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability.' "). 
279. 42 u.s.c. § 12116 (1994). 
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994). 
281. See 42 U.S.C. § 12143 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12149 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12164 (1994); 42 
U.S.C. § 12186(a) (1994). 
282. 42 u.s.c. § 12102 (1994). 
283. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478-80 (noting authority to issue regulations under the ADA 
"is split primarily among three Government agencies . . .  we have no occasion to consider 
what deference [these regulations] are due, if any."); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 
(1998) ("Responsibility for administering the Rehabilitation Act was not delegated to a sin­
gle agency, but we need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold deference to 
agency interpretations under Chevron . . . .  "). 
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Chevron, as Chevron review is premised on a theory of implied dele­
gation. 284 
Did such a delegation occur? Justice Breyer's dissent in Sutton re­
solved this conundrum as follows: Congress delegated authority to the 
EEOC to promulgate regulations interpreting Title I. Title I, in turn, 
extends its protections to a "qualified individual with a disability."285 
Thus, the EEOC has authority to promulgate regulations concerning 
the meaning of a "disability" in order to carry out the provisions of Ti­
tle I. 286 As he noted, 
An EEOC regulation that elaborated on the meaning of this use of 
the word "disability" would fall within the scope both of the basic defini­
tional provision and also the substantive provisions of "this" later sub­
chapter, for the word "disability" appears in both places. 
There is no reason to believe that Congress would have wanted to 
deny the EEOC the power to issue such a regulation, at least if the 
regulation is consistent with the earlier statutory definition and with the 
relevant interpretations by other enforcement agencies. The physical lo­
cation of the definitional section seems to reflect only drafting or stylistic, 
not substantive, objectives. And to pick and choose among which of "this 
subchapter['s]" words the EEOC has the power to explain would inhibit 
the development of law that coherently interprets this important stat­
ute.287 
The majority's response to Justice Breyer's position was to dismiss 
it as an "imaginative interpretation of the Act's delegation provision 
. . .  belied by the terms and structure of the ADA."288 But the Court 
should not have dismissed Justice Breyer's position out of hand. 
Rather, his is a reasoned approach to the delegation question that is 
consistent with the terms and structure of the ADA. 
Title I, the employment Title of the ADA, generally restricts its 
protections to one who is a "qualified individual with a disability."289 
The definition section of Title I defines that term to mean "an individ-
284. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
285. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8) (1994). 
286. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513-15. The Justice Department made a similar argument 
for deference to its Title III regulations in its amicus brief to the Court in Bragdon v. Abbott. 
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10 n.3, 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (97-156). Curiously, the Court appeared more recep­
tive to the argument in Bragdon than in Sutton. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
287. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 514-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
288. Id. at 479. 
289. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). I say "generally" because Title I also protects indi­
viduals from discrimination because of their relationship to or association with an individual 
with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Title I also broadly prohibits preemployment 
medical inquiries and disclosure of medical information; courts have found that nondisabled 
employees may bring claims for violations of these provisions. See, e.g. , Cossette v. Minn. 
Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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ual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the essential job functions of the employment position 
that such individual holds or desires. "290 By delegating to the EEOC 
the authority to explain the meaning of Title I, Congress necessarily 
conferred on the agency the power to flesh out the meaning of this 
most important provision. Of course, its interpretation must be meas­
ured against the statutory language in the general definition section, 
but that does not deprive the agency of authority to bring those words 
to life within the meaning of Title I. Importantly, the agency's regula­
tions and Interpretive Guidance plainly state that they are issued for 
the purpose of implementing Title l's provisions pertaining "to the 
employment of qualified individuals with disabilities."291 
This argument makes particular sense when we understand that 
the EEOC is not purporting to give meaning to the term "individual 
with a disability" for the full panoply of circumstances in which the 
ADA applies. Rather, the EEOC necessarily is interpreting the term 
in the context of the employment provisions of the ADA. That Title 
does not protect all persons with a disability, but only those with a dis­
ability who are qualified for their jobs.292 The EEOC's understanding 
of who is an individual with a disability is understandably and cor­
rectly influenced by Title l's refinement of the term. 
This approach, however, suggests that the meaning of disability 
may vary depending upon which Title of the ADA is being invoked. 
Could one be an individual with a disability for some Titles of the 
ADA but not for others? 
Perhaps. For example, mitigating measures may be what enable an 
individual to perform essential job functions and thus render her a 
qualified individual with a disability.293 If so, assessment of her condi­
tion in its unmitigated state to determine whether she has a disability 
makes sense in the context of Title I, as it is merely a first step in de­
termining protected class status.294 Under Title III, however, which 
290. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8) (1994). 
291. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.l(a) (1999). 
292. But cf School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) ("The defi­
nition of 'handicapped individual' is broad, but only those individuals who are both handi­
capped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief."). 
293. In Sutton, for example, the twins were not contending that they were qualified to 
fly an airplane in their unmitigated state. It was their eyeglasses that enabled them, so they 
claimed, to perform the job's essential functions. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 503-04 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
294. As Justice Stevens correctly noted, 
[Sutton] . . .  is not about whether petitioners are genuinely qualified or whether they can per­
form the job of an airline pilot without posing an undue safety risk. The case just raises the 
threshold question whether petitioners are members of the AD A's protected class. It simply 
asks whether the ADA lets petitioners in the door in the same way as the Age Discrimina­
tion in Employment Act of 1967 does for every person who is at least 40 years old . . .  and as 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does for every single individual in the work force. 
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does not limit its protections to qualified individuals with disabilities, 
but instead protects individuals with disabilities, it is sensible to assess 
a condition in its mitigated state.295 Determining whether a place of 
public accommodation is accessible and usable by individuals with a 
disability logically may be made after taking mitigating measures into 
account. If medicine or mitigating measures routinely allow individu­
als with a particular impairment to use a facility without a problem, it 
makes little sense to require the facility to be designed for use in the 
impairment's unmitigated state. 
Accordingly, that the term "individual with a disability" is not 
found within Title I is not sufficient reason to deprive the EEOC of 
Chevron deference when it is interpreting that term in the context of 
Title 1.296 By delegating to the agency the authority to promulgate 
regulations interpreting Title I, Congress gave the agency the power to 
flesh out the parameters of Title I's protected class. 
B.  The Question of Format 
Although Congress gave the EEOC the power to issue substantive 
regulations to carry out Title I of the ADA, and although the EEOC 
did promulgate such regulations, its position on the "mitigating meas­
ures" question appears in an Interpretive Guidance that accompanied 
the regulations, not in the regulations themselves.297 Was the format of 
the interpretation a basis for not deferring to the EEOC under Chev­
ron ?298 Put another way, does Chevron review apply only to an 
agency's regulations, and not to interpretations expressed in less for­
mal formats, as some commentators assert?299 The Court reserved this 
issue in Sutton. 
This, too, is a question on which lower courts disagree.300 Some be­
lieve the format in which an agency interpretation appears is irrele-
Id. at 504 (citation omitted). 
295. 42 u.s.c. § 12182 (1994). 
296. Nor should the fact that more than one agency has been delegated authority to in­
terpret the general definition matter. As one commentator has explained, "If Congress 
grants multiple agencies substantive rulemaking powers, then the court should review the 
regulations of each agency by trying to harmonize the statute and the regulations. The sepa­
rate sets of rules would be like separate subchapters of a statute, each supplementing more 
general provisions found in the law." Duffy, supra note 18, at 208. 
297. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
298. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 ("Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these 
interpretive guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due."). 
299. See DA VIS & PIERCE, supra note 38, at 119-20; Harris, supra note 22, at 602; 
Hernandez, supra note 22, at 334-35; Herz, supra note 41, at 190; Yavelberg, supra note 82, 
at 186. But see Scalia, supra note 4, at 519 (arguing that the format in which interpretation 
appears does not matter). 
300. Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (Interpretive Guid­
ance gets Skidmore deference); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 
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vant, so long as the agency has been delegated interpretive author­
ity. 301 This approach, however, is misguided. Before deference to an 
agency's statutory interpretation should occur, a court must be satis­
fied that the agency intended to exercise the authority it was dele­
gated.302 There is a significant difference between an agency interpre­
tation pronounced in an amicus brief or opinion letter and an 
interpretation that issues after notice and comment procedures have 
been followed.303 
The Supreme Court confirmed as much in its 1999 Term. In 
Christensen v. Harris County,304 the Court refused to apply Chevron­
styled deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter. Such inter­
pretations, said the Court, are entitled to Skidmore, not Chevron, re­
view. 
When an interpretation issues after informal rulemaking proce­
dures have been followed, however, whether the interpretation is ex­
pressed in a regulation or in an Interpretive Guidance should make no 
difference. As the Christensen Court observed, Chevron review is re­
served for interpretations "arrived at after, for example, a formal ad­
judication or notice-and-comment rulemaking."305 Importantly, an in­
terpretation promulgated after notice and comment procedures 
(5th Cir. 1998) (Interpretive Guidelines entitled to Skidmore, not Chevron, deference); 
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) (interpretive rule gets Skidmore def­
erence); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (will give Chevron 
deference only to regulations, not to Interpretive Guidance); Harris v. H & W Contracting 
Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996) (Interpretive Guidance gets Chevron deference). At the 
time the court decided Sutton, the Supreme Court had noted, but not resolved, this question. 
See City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 n.5 (1994) ("[W]e need not con­
sider whether an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the Administrator's 
in this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpretation adopted by 
rule published in the Federal Register, or by adjudication."); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (legislative rules distinction "anachronistic"). 
301. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Chev­
ron deference to an EEOC amicus brief); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (applying Chevron deference to a decision letter). 
302. Anthony, supra note 35, at 44-48; Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like - Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind 
the Public, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1355-59 (1992); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Binding Effect of 
Affirmative Action Guidelines, 1 LAB. LAW. 261, 267 (1985); Saunders, supra note 82, at 374-
82; White, supra note 2, at 87-88, 102-07. 
303. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 485 n.3 (1991) ("EEOC's position is not em­
bodied in any formal issuance from the agency, such as a regulation, guideline, policy state­
ment or administrative adjudication. Instead, it is merely the EEOC's litigating position in 
recent lawsuits. Accordingly, it is entitled to little, if any deference."); Saunders, supra note 
82, at 374-82. Professor Merrill advocates deference to agency interpretations, regardless of 
format, so long as the agency is acting as a decisionmaker and not as a party to court pro­
ceedings. Merrill, supra note 4, at 987-88, 1010. 
304. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
305. Id. at 587. Although the Christensen Court equated interpretive guidelines with 
opinion letters, it did so on the apparent assumption that such guidelines were not a product 
of rulemaking procedures. Id. 
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signifies the agency's intent to exercise its delegated interpretive 
authority.306 Moreover, the benefits of agency expertise and political 
accountability that underlie Chevron have been served when a statu­
tory interpretation issues after informal rulemaking procedures.307 
Thus, when an agency possesses legislative rulemaking authority and 
has followed legislative rulemaking procedures, its interpretation is 
deserving of deference, whether that interpretation is expressed in a 
rule or in an interpretive guideline.308 
The Interpretive Guidance on mitigating measures illustrates this 
point. The Guidance issued only after informal rulemaking procedures 
were followed.309 It was a direct response to comments received during 
306. The EEOC has recognized this distinction. While it produces opinion letters, ami­
cus briefs and policy guidances, the EEOC issues its Interpretive Guidelines only after fol­
lowing notice and comment procedures and sometimes after public hearings have occurred. 
See White, supra note 2, at 103-04. See also Blumrosen, supra note 302, at 267-79. 
307. Saunders, supra note 82, at 374-82. In addition, as Professor Saunders notes, ex­
tending Chevron deference only to interpretations following notice and comment procedures 
prevents agencies from sidestepping the AP A's rulemaking procedures. Id. 
308. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
("In an era when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron, the 'legislative 
rules vs. other action' dichotomy of Gilbert is an anachronism."). Moreover, as Professor 
Saunders has observed, when an interpretation is the product of delegated authority, it is the 
functional equivalent of a legislative rule and thus should issue only after notice and com­
ment procedures have been followed. Saunders, supra note 82, at 382. See Alfred W. 
Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV: Affirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1993) (urging Chevron deference to EEOC guidelines is­
sued after rulemaking procedures); White, supra note 2, at 105 (stating that EEOC interpre­
tive guidelines are entitled to Chevron deference). 
309. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) 
(No. 97-1992): 
Exactly one year after the passage of the ADA, the EEOC issued final rules for enforcement 
of the ADA. Included with those rules was an appendix entitled "Interpretive Guidance." 
The EEOC followed the same notice and comment procedures in promulgating both the 
text of the final regulations and the Interpretive Guidance. 
Id. See generally Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities; Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 8586-8603 (1991) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). In response 
to comments received, the mitigating measures interpretive guidance was revised to clarify 
"that the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits one or more major life 
activities is to be made without regard to the availability of medicines, assistive devices, or 
other mitigating measures." Americans with Disabilities Act; Implementation: Equal Em­
ployment for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,727-28 (1991) (proposed July 26, 
1991). See Colker, supra note 22, at 155-56 (noting that "the EEOC carefully followed stan­
dard procedures regarding notice and comment in promulgating the mitigating measures 
rule" and that the Supreme Court deferred to a similar guidance promulgated by HHS in the 
Arline case); Kamholz, supra note 22, at 104 n.47 ("[T]he EEOC's guidelines on mitigating 
measures deserves special deference."). 
One commentator points out that the mitigating measures rule was originally included 
with the rule vis-a-vis impairments, not "substantial limitation." Wern, supra note 3, at 1565. 
He contends that the Interpretive Guidance thus fails the "notice" requirements of the 
APA, "even though it was amended in direct response to the comment process. Id. As this 
commentator concedes, however, the draft notice did contain the following example: "A 
diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma would be substantially limited because 
the individual can only perform major life activities with the aid of medication." Equal Em-
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the rulemaking process and clarified how the EEOC intended to ana­
lyze the statutory definition of disability.310 
Thus, that the interpretation is found in an Appendix to the 
Regulations, issued simultaneously with those regulations, is no basis 
for denying the interpretation the deference to which it otherwise 
would be due. While format should sometimes matter in deciding 
whether Chevron applies,311 format was not a proper basis for denying 
Chevron review in the Sutton case. The agency's interpretation was a 
product of deliberate and informed decisionmaking, one that followed 
notice and comment procedures. Because the agency was exercising 
the authority delegated to it in a manner that conformed to the Ad­
ministrative Procedures Act, the distinction between the regulation 
and its interpretive guidance is of no moment for Chevron purposes. 
C. The Seminole Rock Claim 
In its brief to the Court, the EEOC went one step further. It 
claimed a heightened deference for its Interpretive Guidance, insisting 
that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling on 
the Court unless that interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.312 For 
support, the EEOC cited, inter alia, the Court's opinion in Auer v. 
Robbins. 313 
At issue before the Court in Auer was how the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act's "salary basis" test should be interpreted.314 The FLSA di­
rects the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations "defining and 
delimiting" statutory exemptions from the wage/hour laws.315 The Sec­
retary has done so, through regulations proclaiming that an employee 
must be paid on a "salary basis" in order to be an exempt executive, 
administrative or professional employee.316 In Auer, rather than en­
gaging in its own interpretation of the salary basis test, the Court in­
stead invited the Secretary to submit an amicus brief interpreting the 
ployment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 
Fed. Reg. at 8593. The EEOC's position was contained in the proposed rule and was clari­
fied in response to comments, which, of course, is the point of notice and comment pro­
ceedings. See Colker, supra note 22, at 154-55. 
310. Americans with Disabilities Act; Implementation: Equal Employment for Indi­
viduals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,727-28. 
311. See supra notes 302-304 and accompanying text. 
312. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17-18, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 
U.S. 516 (1999) (No. 97-1992). 
313. Id. (citing 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). 
314. Id. at 454. 
315. 29 u.s.c. § 213 (1994). 
316. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1999). 
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regulation.317 The Court then deferred to that interpretation, labeling 
it "controlling" unless "plainly erroneous. "318 
The EEOC, along with the petitioners in Sutton, urged the Court 
to follow Auer and to view the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance as 
"controlling."319 But that view reflects a misunderstanding of Auer and 
of the Seminole Rock doctrine320 on which Auer was based. In Auer, 
the language being interpreted was "a creature of the Secretary's own 
regulations."321 When an agency is interpreting its own regulation, the 
Court has extended a particularly strong measure of deference to the 
agency's interpretation.322 This is particularly true when the regulation 
is not interpreting the statute but is filling in statutory gaps in accor­
dance with an express legislative directive to do so.323 
No such situation, however, was present in Sutton. The Interpre­
tive Guidance was not interpreting the regulation. Rather it was inter­
preting the words of the statute itself.324 Thus, Sutton was a Chevron, 
not a Seminole Rock, case. 
This understanding of the limits of the Seminole Rock doctrine ob­
viates concerns that the EEOC could inflate the deference it is due 
when interpreting the ADA through use of an Interpretive Guidance, 
as opposed to a regulation.325 The EEOC may not ratchet up the level 
317. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
318. Id. 
319. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 
516 (1999) (No. 97-1992); Petitioner' Brief at 16, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471 (1999) (No. 97-1943). 
320. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seminole Rock 
form of deference. 
321. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
322. "Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his 
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or in­
consistent with the regulation.' " Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945)). See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (the Auer Court 
extended deference to an agency brief because the Secretary was interpreting his own regu­
lation); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995). 
323. Under the Secretary's regulation, exempt status from the minimum wage and over­
time requirements of the FLSA requires that employees' salaries not be "subject to" reduc­
tion because of the quantity or quality of work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1999). The operative 
language at issue in Auer was the phrase "subject to," which appears in the regulation, not in 
the statute. The regulatory test was created in response to Congress's directive to the Secre­
tary to define the scope of exemptions for administrative, professional and executive em­
ployees. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
324. The question before the Court in Sutton was how the phrase "substantially limits" 
should be construed, a term found in the statute itself. See, e.g. , Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. The 
regulation and the Interpretive Guidance both attempted to flesh out the meaning of this 
statutory term. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. This point was correctly noted 
in Respondent's Brief at 24, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (No. 
97-1992). 
325. See Manning, supra note 41, at 618, who criticizes the Seminole Rock doctrine as a 
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of judicial deference to its interpretation of "substantially limits" (or 
other statutory terms such as "reasonable accommodation" or "undue 
hardship") by placing that interpretation in an "Interpretive Guid­
ance" instead of in the regulation itself.326 Whether in the regulation or 
in the Appendix accompanying it, the agency's interpretation is of the 
statutory language. 
Accordingly, the language at issue in Sutton, unlike in Auer, was 
not the agency's creature; it was instead the creature of Congress. 
Thus, Chevron, not Seminole Rock, was the appropriate precedent to 
apply. The EEOC's claim in Sutton to a more heightened form of def­
erence to its Interpretive Guidance was misplaced, an important point 
to understand as further questions concerning the proper interpreta­
tion of the AD A's Title I emerge. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What was presented to the Court in Sutton was a difficult policy 
choice; how best to resolve the mitigating measures puzzle was an is­
sue on which reasonable people could disagree.327 The Chevron doc­
trine teaches that the judiciary is not the government branch responsi­
ble for resolving such choices when Congress has delegated, expressly 
or by implication, interpretive authority to an administrative agency. 
Moreover, the issue before the Sutton Court was one well-suited 
for Chevron deference. Congress had conferred substantive rulemak­
ing authority on the EEOC, recognizing that formulation of policies 
affecting the disabled require the kind of expertise that administrative 
agencies are intended and able to supply. For these reasons, it makes 
sense to believe that Congress intended that policy choices implicated 
by implementation of the ADA be made by administrative agencies, 
rather than by courts. The EEOC had carefully considered the issue at 
hand, issuing its interpretation following notice and comment proce­
dures. The agency's resolution of the interpretive issue was well­
supported by, and consistent with, the legislative history, and it was re­
sponsive to the unique aspects of Title I of the ADA. 
The Supreme Court, however, has become accustomed to placing 
its own imprint on federal statutes in general and employment dis-
violation of separation of powers principles by permitting agencies to both write the Jaw and 
say what the law means. 
326. Professor Manning, for example, asserts that Seminole Rock encourages agencies to 
promulgate vague regulations and then interpret those regulations through other formats, a 
result that undercuts the APA's rulemaking process. Id. Those concerns, however, were not 
present in Sutton. The EEOC was interpreting the statute, not its regulations, and both its 
regulation and its Interpretive Guidance issued after notice and comment procedures had 
been followed. See supra notes 309-310 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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crimination laws in particular.328 The Court's employment of a textu­
alist interpretive strategy to decide Sutton at Step One of Chevron 
epitomizes the way in which the Court has employed a purportedly 
neutral "methodology" both to disguise and to justify an increased ju­
dicial activism. The Court has been accused in the past of 
"breach[ing] . . .  political faith" by conservatively interpreting progres­
sive civil rights statutes,329 and the Sutton decision follows this well­
worn path. But that it does so in the guise of finding clear congres­
sional meaning does a disservice to more than the law of employment 
discrimination. It also breaches political faith with the implied delega­
tion doctrine underlying Chevron. 
328. See supra notes 83, 92-94 and accompanying text. 
329. Eskridge, supra note 83, at 684. 
